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Article
The Normative Logic of Global Economic
Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental
Justification for the Rule of Law and Human
Rights
Kevin T. Jackson*
INTRODUCTION
Global economic governance régimes are frequently touted
as providing innovative ways1 for transnational business
enterprises, often working in collaboration2 with governments,
international
organizations,
and
non-governmental
organizations (NGOs),3 to advance corporate social
responsibility (CSR)4 and tackle social problems in developing
*
Daniel Janssen Chair, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and
Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles (Brussels, Belgium); Professor of
Law and Ethics, Graduate School of Business, Fordham University (New
York, New York, United States).
1. See, e.g., Constantine E. Passaris, Redesigning Financial Governance
for the New Global Economy of the 21st Century, 14:1 J. COMP. INT’L MGMT. 1,
1-2 (2011) (calling multinational and transnational private corporations
catalysts of globalization and arguing that global economic régimes are
essential to the modern global economy).
2. See Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION
226, 229–30 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003) [hereinafter
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY] (describing the emerging system of
governance by non-state, private sector actors alongside national and
international regulatory systems).
3. See Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 1 (noting the shift from
“public” and state governance to governance by regions, municipalities,
supranational organizations, and private actors like multinational
corporations and NGOs).
4. See Peter Gourevitch, Corporate Governance: Global Markets,
National Politics, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY supra note 2, at
305, 312–15 (arguing that corporate governance is now connected to global
governance; mechanisms for corporate governance include market pressures,
national regulatory systems, international institutions, treaties, legislation,
politicians, specialized associations, and NGOs); James N. Rosenau,
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countries.5 In pursuing these objectives, such régimes typically
operate outside of traditional frameworks of “hard”
international law.6
Yet, the means employed by global governance régimes in
the deployment of public-private power and even private
power7 alone should be viewed from a critical perspective to
ensure they are subject to adequate restraint. Accordingly, this
article argues that the constraints of rule of law and of human
rights ought to attach not only to the conduct of states and
their agents but also to the conduct of all international
economic participants.
The reasons for demanding special scrutiny are simple.
First, society cannot trust corporations to be “good”8 any more
so than it can trust nation-states to be “good,”9 regardless of
Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13, 23 (1995)
(suggesting that the required control mechanisms for an ever-more
interdependent world outstrip the capacity and readiness of national
governments, thus leading NGOs to serve as emerging actors in transnational
governance).
5. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 75 (2005) (improving the conditions of
factory and agricultural workers in developing countries has become a major
focus of contemporary corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the 1990s).
6. See David Vogel, Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, in
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 153–54 [hereinafter THE POLITICS
OF GLOBAL REGULATION] (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009)
(describing how multinational firms and global supply networks operate in a
regulatory framework of “soft law” consisting of private, non-state, or marketbased standards operating outside and/or alongside the state and “hard” law).
7. See generally VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE
SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001); Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the
International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 3, 3–22 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002)
(describing the growing number of non-state and private actors participating
in international governance).
8. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207, 207–08 (Doreen
McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY] (referencing PHILIP SELZNICK, THE COMMUNITARIAN
PERSUASION 101–02 (2002) and Selznick’s notion of the need for “corporate
conscience” to ensure that businesses are held accountable and take their
responsibilities seriously).
9. See generally, e.g., Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and the Economic Crisis of
2008, 13 CORP. REPUTATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 110, 110–23 (2010)
(explaining that the drop in public confidence in business and government
after financial crisis was due to the perception that wealthy business people
received inequitable, preferential treatment over ordinary Americans).
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how noble-sounding corporations’ rhetorics are and despite the
fact that NGOs take on roles as corporations’ invigilators.
Indeed, while many NGOs appear well-intentioned, society
often forgets they are special interest organizations committed
to advancing narrow agendas. NGOs are not necessarily
reliable guardians of the common global good.10 Second, despite
how powerful and influential corporations, international
organizations, NGOs, and other economic participants in global
civil society are from a descriptive standpoint, considering
matters from a normative standpoint leads to a demand for
justification and legitimacy.11 Participants in economic
governance cannot, as a matter of justice and morality, stand
above the constraints of the rule of law.12 Nor can they escape
responsibilities for human rights.13 Even though such actors
may gain prominence in a descriptive and instrumental sense,
they must be regarded as restrained in a normative and noninstrumental sense by objective universal moral standards.14
From a logical point of view, it is insufficient to merely
describe, as political scientists15 and economists16 have, the
10. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 6, at 44, 47 (explaining that
firms, NGOs, and other actors operate in the transnational regulatory space
not as neutrals seeking “good governance” but as partisans pursuing their own
special interests and values).
11. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 n.86 (1998) (linking the
concepts of normative factors, legitimacy, and justification).
12. See, e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, Corporate Obligations under
International Law, 71 INT’L ASS’N REP. CONF. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that it has
long been established that corporations have legal obligations, especially in
areas of labor and environmental law).
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[E]very individual and every organ of
society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their
jurisdiction.”).
14. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 80–81 (2004) (referencing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977) and Dworkin’s notion that the rule of law consists of more
than mere rules; it also encompasses the community’s shared overarching
moral and political principals).
15. See generally THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 6
(providing political perspectives on emerging global economic governance).
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emergence of new arrangements for global economic
governance. Their efforts in documenting, classifying, and
providing empirical analysis of power shifts do not provide
moral justifications or groundings of legitimacy. It is also
insufficient, as management theorists17 have done, to propose
innovative instrumental strategies for managing the various
stakeholder interests at play in emerging forms of governance.
Indeed, as one surveys relevant literature, it becomes clear that
an instrumentalist conception dominates in many of the recent
portrayals of “new governance” régimes.18 Such depictions are
mainly concerned with the efficacy of international régimes or
networks and with the question of what motivates business
enterprises to comply with “soft law.” Generally, “soft law” is
seen as an embodiment of corporate social responsibility or
sustainability.19 Some writers explain this compliance in terms
of accountability (business competitiveness, risk management
and corporate image),20 profitability,21 club theory,22 and

16. See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, The Leverage of Economic Theories:
Explaining Governance in an Internationalized Industry, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 33, 33–59 (describing globalization as the
reduction of barriers to economic exchange and a greater mobility in economic
integration).
17. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Corporate Social
Responsibility, Public Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United
States: An Institutional-Stakeholder Perspective, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 47, 47–73
(2006) (using neo-institutional and stakeholder theory to reflect on the
legitimacy of stakeholder causes and their effects on corporate social
responsibility).
18. See e.g., Jean-Pascal Gond, Guido Palazzo, & Kunal Basu,
Reconsidering Instrumental Corporate Social Responsibility through the Mafia
Metaphor, 19 BUS. ETHIC Q. 57, 57–89 (2009) (using an instrumental
perspective to critically evaluate CSR in theory and practice by considering
the organized Italian mafia).
19. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 16–47 (arguing there is a bottom line case
for business virtue that motivates CSR); see also Simon Zadek & Alex
McGillivray, Responsible Competitiveness: Making Sustainability Count in
Global Markets, HARV. INT’L REV. 72, 72–77 (2008).
20. Simon Zadek, The Logic of Collaborative Governance: Corporate
Responsibility, Accountability, and the Social Contract 3 (Corp. Soc.
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 17, 2006) (framing compliance as
a matter of business management, competitiveness, and corporate image).
21. VOGEL, supra note 5, at 19–24 (“Virtually all contemporary writing on
CSR emphasizes its links to corporate profitability.”).
22. See generally VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE
(Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009) (suggesting that club theory
in voluntary programs offers a compliance mechanism for holding firms
socially responsible for their promises).
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prisoners’ dilemma or coordination externality incentives.23
While such studies are important, society nevertheless stands
in need of a normative, non-instrumental justificatory approach
to global economic governance.
An analogy may be helpful to underscore the importance of
a call for normative justification beyond mainly descriptive
accounts. It is one thing to objectively report and accurately
chronicle the rise of organized syndicates alongside of, and
sometimes in strategic collaboration with, governmental
structures while noting their instrumental success in
advancing economic interests.24 However, it would be nearly
impossible to articulate a plausible normative justification for
the rise of organized syndicates, especially given their
notorious disregard and contempt for the rule of law and
human rights.25 This analogy highlights the wide gulf that can
exist between descriptive and normative accounts of
phenomena.
The concepts of the rule of law on one hand and human
rights on the other make up two of the most critical
frameworks for understanding and articulating the legal and
moral responsibilities of participants in today’s emerging
transnational governance régimes. This is the case in both
theory and in practice. The discourse of the rule of law and the
language of human rights permeate many theories of
international law, political theory, and scholarship in
international economic relations.26 The formulation of corporate
ethics codes, industry-wide regulatory standards, and
collaborative schemes with states and NGOs are examples of
how such discussions figure prominently into the practical
23. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International "Standards” and
International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 345, 345–70
(2001) (using the concept of the prisoner’s dilemma to discuss corporate
compliance incentives).
24. See generally THOMAS REPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA: A HISTORY OF ITS
RISE TO POWER (2004) (chronicling the history of organized syndicates in
America); Gond, Palazzo, & Basu, supra note 18.
25. Anup Shah, Corporations and Human Rights, GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/51/corporations-and-human-rights
(last
updated Sept. 19, 2002) (noting that with companies’ drive for profits, “there
has often come a disregard for human rights”).
26. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 14, at 127–36; Terry Nardin,
Theorising the International Rule of Law, 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 385, 401 (2008).
See also Anthony D’Amato, Are Human Rights Good for International
Business?, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 22, 22–32 (1979); David Kinley & Junko
Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities
for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 931–1023 (2004).
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undertakings of business enterprises.27 Practical undertakings
also support the efforts of civil society and legal officials to
delineate the nature and scope of the responsibilities attending
those initiatives.28
This article addresses the heart of these ideas. It takes an
epistemological approach involving higher-order philosophical
analysis and reflection providing a conceptual space for
articulating a normative and non-instrumental foundation for
the rule of law and human rights.
As a logical first step, one needs to define “rule of law” and
“human rights.” This is an epistemological problem. Are the
schemes based upon non-instrumental moral commitment to
law and rights, or instead divorced from the normative realm
and driven purely by the instrumental power interests of
transnational actors?29 This article proposes drawing upon
concepts from the philosophy of law and relating them to key
features of global economic governance arrangements in an
effort to comprehend the extent of congruence with the rule of
law and human rights taken in normative, non-instrumental
terms.
Unlike descriptive theory which explains how things are,
normative theory describes how things ought to be.30 Expressed
in terms pertaining to the global governance context, a
normative theory is needed to guide economic participants as to
27. Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law,
Through Law, For Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 8, at 10–12 (highlighting the
increase in corporate codes of conduct, ethics codes, and industry wide
commitments; for example, all US Fortune 500 companies have implemented
codes of conduct).
28. Lee A. Tavis, The Globalization Phenomenon and Multinational
Corporate Developmental Responsibility, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT: AN
IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 13, 23 (Oliver F. Williams ed., 2000) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT] (describing the partnership between civil sector
regulation and private and state actors).
29. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to
Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371, 377 (2010) (providing a
non-instrumental moral account of transnational corporations’ commitments
to defending human rights beyond mere strategy).
30. David Over, Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 3 (Derek J.
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (saying that normative theories “aim to
tell us how we ideally should or ought to reason, make judgments, and take
decisions. These theories, particularly formal logic, probability theory, and
decision theory, give us rules to follow or conform to that supposedly make our
thought rational,” while descriptive theories “try to describe how people
actually think.”).
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how they ought to act.31 Further, a theory may appear to be
normative yet actually be a descriptive account, offering
contingent directives, what Immanuel Kant termed
“hypothetical imperatives,”32 that instruct participants in an
instrumental fashion. These “hypothetical imperatives” tell
participants how they should act if they wish to attain some
particular objective. Nevertheless, a full-blooded normative
theory attempts to provide “categorical imperatives,”33 lending
moral direction about how participants ought to act in any case,
that is, in a non-instrumental way.
This article has two main sections. The first centers on the
rule of law, while the second focuses on human rights.
Concerning the rule of law discussion in the first section, a
normative, non-instrumental account is achieved through the
Kantian conception of a regulative ideal.34 Regarding the
treatment of human rights in the second section, a normative,
non-instrumental account is attained by way of a common
public justification for human rights norms of business.35 Such
understandings of rule of law and human rights respectively, it
is argued, are best suited to provide a normative benchmark
against which to assess particular extant régimes.
Part A of the first section begins with an overview of
emerging global governance régimes, indicating the ways that
such régimes pose special problems from the standpoint of an
international rule of law. Part B discusses accountability and
methods for enforcement of global governance régimes. Part C
attempts to summarize formulations of the rule of law.
Contrasting instrumental and non-instrumental conceptions of
law, Part C argues that whereas instrumental accounts may
appear to lend support to decentralized and fragmented
features of global governance, what is called for on a deeper
level is a non-instrumental understanding of law.
Accomplishing such an understanding requires that the rule of
law be posited not as a descriptive constitutive notion but
31. Rodney J. Blackman, Supplemental Paper: There Is There There:
Defending the Defenseless with Procedural Natural Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 285,
309 (citing WILLIAM FRANKENA, ETHICS 5 (1963)) (noting that normative
theories answer problems about what is right or about what ought to be done).
32. See generally ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY
(1989).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Garth Meintjes, An International Human Rights Perspective on
Corporate Codes, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 83.
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instead as a normative regulative principle. Part C concludes
by deriving the core of this ideal from mainstream accounts of
the rule of law.
Part A of the second section discusses how instrumental
justification for human rights in global governance has arisen,
first in support of corporate social responsibility generally and
then by extension into the human rights context from negative
and positive “business case” justifications. Part A provides a
discussion of the inadequacy and logical incoherence of such
justifications. Part B shows how the deeper non-instrumental
character of human rights is established from a common public
and invisible law justification, in contradistinction from
narrower instrumental justifications.
This article concludes that gaining a philosophically
sophisticated understanding of the rule of law and human
rights remains a vital task because such theoretical discussions
can and do play important roles in the contemporary discourse
of global economic governance. The rule of law and human
rights, concepts central to the interplay between international
law and emerging global governance, deserve careful
deliberation. It is important that lawyers, businesspersons,
politicians, and citizens consider them carefully in order to
facilitate meaningful discussions about them, the conditions
that determine their existence, whether they are intrinsically
valuable, and whether they constitute justifiable ideals to
pursue in the design of an emerging world order.
I. GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND THE
RULE OF LAW
A. OVERVIEW OF EMERGING RÉGIMES
The traditional role of “hard”36 public international law is
being confronted by the emergence of informal regulatory
régimes and civil society arrangements for global governance.
Unlike traditional domestic legal régimes whose norms are
enforced through centralized systems of sanctions, emergent

36. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 421–56 (2000) (defining hard law
and explaining differences between hard and soft law; in international law,
hard law encompasses self-executing treaties or international agreements and
customary laws that give rise to legally enforceable commitments on behalf of
states and other subjects of international law).
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“soft law”37 norms of global governance are akin to public
international law in the sense that they rely on decentralized
enforcement mechanisms.
Unlike “hard” public international law, the enforcement
and governance of soft law does not rest on traditional
institutions of public authority.38 Whereas traditionally
corporate governance was shaped by substantive law
promulgated by governmental authority, today’s transnational
businesses function within a new consortium of authorities.39
Areas of authority traditionally reserved to government are
now shared with non-state delegations.40
Numerous accounts of emerging global governance régimes
portray the promulgation of voluntary civil regulations as a
manifestation of acceptance of new social contracts yielded by
growing global societal consensus as to the proper performance,
responsiveness, and responsibility of business enterprises.41
Civil regulation is generated within market-based, non-state,
and private regulatory structures. These components govern
the behavior of transnational enterprises along with their
global supply networks.42
37. See Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L.
L. 499, 499 (1999) (denoting soft law as a self-contained set of obligations
arising out of the occasional preference of nation-states to reach non-binding
agreements and to pattern relations to avoid application of treaty or
customary law); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 26, at 960 (defining soft law
instruments as non-binding, quasi-legal instruments); Alan C. Neal, Corporate
Social Responsibility: Governance Gain or Laissez-Faire Figleaf?, 29 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2008) (noting desirability of so-called soft law
regulations as opposed to the traditional hard law regulatory approach); Mary
Ellen O’Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 109–110, 113 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE] (attributing the flexibility and non-binding
nature of soft law to its existence outside the confines of state made treaties,
and noting that soft law allows for participants beyond nation-states and
inter-governmental organizations).
38. O’Connell, supra note 37, at 110 (“Soft law can fill the gaps of a hard
law instrument without the need for entering into laborious procedure of
treaty amendment.”).
39. See Inger Ulleberg, The Role and Impact of NGOs in Capacity
Development: From Replacing the State to Reinvigorating Education (United
Nations Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. and Int’l Inst. Educ. Plan.), available at
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001869/186980e.pdf.
40. Id. at 8 (“As development actors, NGOs have become the main service
providers in countries where the government is unable to fulfill its traditional
role.”).
41. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 155.
42. See id., at 151, 153–154.
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In global governance, civil regulations ordinarily function
alongside nation-states rather than from within nation-states.43
The advent of soft-law’s regulatory influence outside nations’
regulatory schemes has empowered transnational non-state
actors.44 This gives the private sector a much more prominent
public role. Private authorities have a growing role in
transnational economic regulation.45 Corporations are now
forming a part of an emerging global public sphere.46
Civil regulations are not replacements for nation-states,
but instead institute governance régimes within wider global
structures of “social capacity and agency” where none existed
before.47 The advent of civil regulation spells the emergence of
a global “governance triangle” where nation-states are just one
component of global regulatory authority.48
The idea of governance without government first appeared
in scholarly literature in the 1990s.49 Arising as a consequence
of economic globalization, it signaled changes that globalization
caused in the governance structure of international society.50
The word “governance” began referring to self-organizing
systems growing up alongside hierarchies and markets that
comprise government structures.51
Global governance refers to the expansion of the sphere of
influence of governing structures to entities beyond nationstates that do not have sovereign authority.52 Governance and
government are logically distinct phenomena.53 Governance

8.

43. See Haufler, supra note 2.
44. Id. at 226–27.
45. HAUFLER, supra note 7, at 1–5; Hall & Biersteker, supra note 7, at 4–

46. HAUFLER, supra note 7, at 7.
47. John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain –
Issues, Actors, and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 519 (2004).
48. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 44–50.
49. For an example of an early work discussing governance, see Linda
Cornett & James A. Caporaso, “And Still It Moves:” State Interests and Social
Forces in the European Community, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT:
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 219, 228 (James N. Rosenau & ErnstOtto Czempiel eds., 1992) (referencing Cecchini Report and White Papers).
50. See generally id.
51. R. A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without
Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652, 660 (1996).
52. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, at 369.
53. Kahler & Lake, Globalization and Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 7 (defining governance as the “sum of the
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their
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connotes a process founded on the absence of centralized
international governmental authority.54 “Global governance”
can involve joint efforts of public, private, and civil-society
organizations undertaking roles within the international realm
that governments traditionally have assumed within the
nation-state.55 “Governance” is taken in a “public” sense to
mean that which government does.56 Although global
governance is undertaken by a variety of private and public
actors across the spectrum of civil society, it is the “public”
character underlying the idea of governance that relates to this
article’s inquiry about whether and to what extent global
governance takes place under the color of rule of law. A demand
for justification is insistent given that global governance
presumes to deal authoritatively with international human
rights, which traditionally have been juridical concepts resting
at the core of the rule of law.57
1. Varieties of Global Civil Regulations
The growth of CSR has brought about novel global
governance mechanisms and business civil regulations.58
Global companies are seeking to propagate principles for
responsible business conduct in different ways.59 These ways
common affairs” and opining that governance is patterned social interaction.)
54. Id. at 8 (emphasizing that regardless of how it is conceived,
governance is not government).
55. James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 49, at 286–287 (noting that depending on an individual’s
loyalty, he or she may prefer governance by a territorial community, a
previously-existing nation-state, a historic nation, a regional community, etc.).
56. John Donahue, On Collaborative Governance 1–2 (Corp. Soc.
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 2, 2004) (contradicting the notion
that public governance is outside of and transcendent to government, and
instead noting that governance is what government does; firms and NGOs
work in collaboration with, not outside of, the government parameter).
57. See generally James W. Nickel, Is Today’s International Human
Rights System a Global Governance Regime?, 6 J. ETHICS 353, 353 (2002).
58. McBarnet, supra note 27, at 9–13 (describing the evolution of CSR
from focusing on the bottom line alone to considering people, the planet, and
profits; as major companies adopt CSR policies, the range of socio-economic
issues continue to expand and impact civil society, and particularly NGOs).
59. See Laura Albareda, Corporate Responsibility, Governance and
Accountability: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE
430, 431 (2008) (discussing the rapid growth of responsible business policies
among transnational corporations and the evolving corporate behavior,
featuring new collaborations and increased cooperation among firms, NGOs,
and transnational companies).

JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013))

82

2/21/2013 1:48 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

are classified as: (1) corporate self-regulatory initiatives which
are voluntary projects taken on individually in the market; (2)
inter-firm and cross-industry cooperative initiatives which are
voluntary tools established cooperatively between firms and
business associations; and (3) collaborative arrangements and
multi-stakeholder partnerships which are voluntary schemes
devised collaboratively with other entities like public-private
and
hybrid
partnerships
(governments,
international
organizations, NGOs, trade unions, and governments).60
2. Corporate Self-Regulatory Initiatives
Numerous large, global companies institute their own
codes of conduct that aim to regulate their operations
worldwide.61 One example of voluntary self-regulation is the
Leon Sullivan Foundation’s promulgation of the Global
Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility (the “Principles”) in
1999.62 The Principles span a breadth of CSR concerns
including employee freedom of association, health and
environmental standards, and sustainable development.63
Fortune 500 companies are now motivated to adjust their
internal practices to comply with the standards found within
the Principles.64
60. Id. at 435–436.
61. See, e.g., Gene R. Laczniak & Jacob Naor, Global Ethics: Wrestling
with the Corporate Conscience, BUS. 3, 7 (July-Sept. 1985) (discussing the
corporate examples of Caterpillar Tractor, Allis Chalmers, Johnson’s Wax, and
Rexnord).
62. See Appendix 27: The Sullivan Principles: Statement of Principles of
U.S. Firms with Affiliates in the Republic of South Africa, in GLOBAL CODES
OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 388–90 (listing the seven main principles
established by the Sullivan Foundation).
63. Oliver F. Williams, A Lesson from the Sullivan Principles: The
Rewards for Being Productive, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28,
at 57–82 (providing an overview of the purposes of the Sullivan Principles,
which include supporting economic, social, and political justice by firms
wherever they conduct operations; advancing human rights and promoting
equality of opportunity at all levels of employment, including racial and
gender diversity on decision-making committees and boards; and training and
advancing disadvantaged workers for technical, supervisory, and management
opportunities).
64. See, e.g., Gordon Leslie Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Do They Care?: The
Marketfor Corporate Global Responsibility and the Role of Institutional
Investors 17–23, 34, (June 16, 2004) (presented at the Using Pensions for
Social Control of Capitalist Investment Conference), available at
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/statelocal/paper-clark.pdf) (describing how CalPERS may withhold investments
from companies that do not meet the Sullivan Principles, thus creating the
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Another example, the Global Business Standards Codex
(“GBS Codex”), was published by a group of scholars in 2005.65
Intended “as a benchmark for [firms] wishing to create their
own world-class code,” the GBS Codex set forth eight principles
shared by five well-known codes embraced by the world’s
largest companies.66 The principles incorporated standards in
the following categories: citizenship, dignity, fairness, fiduciary,
property, reliability, responsiveness, and transparency.67
Individual corporate codes of conduct usually contain an
amalgamation of prudential, technical, and moral norms,
declared as general principles.68 Critics point to the various
codes’ failures to include enforcement sanctions and failures to
emphasize profit maximization.69 Yet, corporations increasingly
specify criteria such as “profitability” and “shareholder
interests” in their mission statements.70 Nevertheless, they also
affirm that corporate responsibility for “stakeholder interests”
means
considering
both
community
interests
and
sustainability.71
risk of reputational harm).
65. See generally Lynn Paine, Rohit Deshpandé, Joshua D. Margolis, &
Kim Eric Bettcher, Upto Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet WorldClass Standards?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2005, at 122–133.
66. Id. at 124–25.
67. Id. at 125.
68. See Arlene I. Broadhurst, Corporations and the Ethics of Social
Responsibility: An Emerging Regime of Expansion and Compliance, 9 BUS.
ETHICS: EUR. REV. 86, 89 (2000) (stating that corporate codes of ethics tend to
be a mixture of technical, prudential, and moral imperatives expressed in
general statements of principle and with varying degrees of enforcement). See
also Robert Kinloch Massie, Effective Codes of Conduct: Lessons from the
Sullivan Principles and CERES Principles, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT,
supra note 28, at 280–82 (describing the blizzard of cultural values making up
corporate codes of conduct, including a mix of ends, means, duties, and goals
both for companies and for broader corporate responsibility); S. Prakash Sethi,
Gaps in Research in the Formulation, Implementation, and Effectiveness
Measurement of International Codes of Conduct, in GLOBAL CODES OF
CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 123–25 (listing the core principles in codes of
conduct as moral and ethical, economic and competitive, and organizational
and institutional).
69. James E. Post, Global Codes of Conduct: Activists, Lawyers, and
Managers in Search of a Solution, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note
28, at 111 (discussing the lack of and difficulty associated with enforcement of
codes of conduct).
70. Broadhurst, supra note 68, at 89.
71. See
Johnson
&
Johnson,
Our
Credo,
http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563df9e22be1bb31559c7/ourcredo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (naming its responsibilities to doctors and nurses,
parents, its employees, the community, the environment, and its
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3. Inter-Firm and Cross-Country Cooperative Initiatives
As key agents in the global economy, transnational firms
wield enormous influence over economic activities.72 Firms use
various instruments to influence global civil society.73 Among
the more significant mechanisms are cross-industry and interfirm cooperative initiatives.74 Such initiatives are developed
through CSR business associations,75 which formulate
strategies for concerted action in the form of self-regulating
proposals within the private sector.76 These non-governmental
associations of businesses promote the dissemination of best
business practices.77 They aim to establish universal, uniform
standards to combat a wide range of practices including
apartheid, conflicts of interest, deception, discrimination,
embezzlement, executive compensation, fraud, forgery,
genocide, insider trading, the misuse of pension funds, slavery,
theft, and corruption.78
shareholders).
72. Virginia Haufler, Self-Regulations and Business Norms: Political Risk,
Political Activism, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 199,
199–201 (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (noting
that corporate agreements among firms impact international economic
regulations by conferring a sense of legitimacy by creating an accepted way of
doing business in certain industries; industry norms then have greater
ramifications for production and local and global political relations).
73. See, e.g., Albareda, supra note 59, at 434–36.
74. See id. (calling inter-firm cooperation the most important mechanism
and noting that the voluntary CSR hybrid crosses industries and creates
public-private hybrid partnerships).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 435 (listing business associations that have adopted CSR
mechanisms: Business in the Community, Business for Social Responsibility,
Caux Round Table, CSR Europe, Forum Empresa, International Business
Leaders Forum, and World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD)).
77. E.g., REDEFINING LEADERSHIP: BSR REPORT 2010 , available at
http://www.bsr.org/pdfs/bsr-report/bsr_report_2010.pdf (describing Business
for Social Responsibility (BSR)’s annual achievements, including running a
program for business ethics, the workplace, the marketplace, the community,
the environment, and the global economy).
78. See Appendix 26: The Caux Principles: Business Behavior for a Better
World, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT, supra note 28, at 384–88 (describing
the Caux Round Table, an international group of business executives
headquartered in Switzerland, which has adopted an international code for
multinational firms in Europe, North America, and Japan; the Code identifies
five basic principles which serve as the aspirational mark for business leaders
worldwide, thus extending beyond principles embodied in earlier codes; the
principles address stakeholder responsibility, social justice, mutual support,
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Business associations serve as forums for corporate leaders
to discuss and agree on CSR plans.79 This entails creation of
consolidated private rules, standards, and management
instruments, all in the absence of legally enforceable “hard”
sanctions.80 The associations often serve as means for collective
exertion of pressure in order, for instance, to defend
corporations’ positions before national governments and
international organizations like the European Union and the
United Nations.81 As such, business associations serve as
interfaces between public and private authorities.82
Joining cooperative regulations is a sage business strategy
for companies whose social or environmental practices have
been spotlighted by activists.83 Whereas implementing higher
environmental or social standards normally increases costs,
inducing the competition to follow suit levels the playing field.84
At least in theory, industry and cross-industry standards
inhibit companies from competing with each other.85 Without
them, firms would be running in a race to the bottom by
adopting less rigorous protections for workers or the
environment.86 Similarly, civil regulations help companies
environmental concern, and avoidance of illicit operations and corrupt
practices).
79. Albareda, supra note 59, at 435.
80. Id. at 433.
81. See, e.g., id. at 435 (“The WBCSD has defended a voluntary approach
before the United Nations; CSR Europe has done the same before the
European Commission and individual European governments, and BSR has
done the same with the US government.”).
82. Id. at 436 (noting that although inter-firm initiatives are typically
funded by corporate contributions, they sometimes receive backing from
international organizations like the European Union, various national
governments, and the United States).
83. See generally Alison Maitland, Industries Seek Safety in Numbers,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2005, at 1–3 (noting the growing phenomenon of global
companies working together to implement standards so as to avoid individual
reputational attacks).
84. See Marvin B. Lieberman & Shigeru Asaba, Why Do Firms Imitate
Each Other?, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366, 366–367 (2006) (noting that imitation
is common because firms want to avoid falling behind their rivals, and because
leveling the playing field breeds competition). But see S. Prakash Sethi &
Linda M. Sama, Ethical Behavior as a Strategic Choice by Large Corporations:
The Interactive Effect of Marketplace Competition, Industry Structure and
Firm Resources, 8 Bus. Ethics Q. 85, 89 (1998) (arguing that the conventional
wisdom and popular notion that competition keeps businesses honest may not
be accurate).
85. Kevin Jackson, VIRTUOSITY IN BUSINESS: INVISIBLE LAW GUIDING THE
INVISIBLE HAND, 237 (Univ. of Pa. Press 2012).
86. Debora Spar & David Yaffe, Multinational Enterprises and the
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complement one another in instituting best practices.87 They
also help with communication and implementation of
operational upgrades recommended by civil society.88 NGOs’
participation in civil regulations extends a higher level of
legitimacy than can be achieved with codes of conduct authored
by individual companies.89
This partnership increases the credibility of companies’
commitments to corporate social responsibility.90 Moreover,
transnational enterprises often follow their industry peers to
implement comparable procedures and norms.91 This follow the
leader dynamic spreads to managerial protocols including
global CSR undertakings.92 Hence, if an industry leader
consents to a code of practices, its industry peers typically
follow suit.93 This trend also works across sectors.94 Indeed, the
Prospects for Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 557, 557 (1999) (suggesting that MNCs
should act as their own self-regulators in improving corporate governance to
avoid a downward race to the bottom where each party lowers its standards).
87. See Broadhurst, supra note 68 at 96–97 (discussing Shell as the
prototype for other corporations in reforming best practices and encouraging
other corporations to promote socially responsible conduct).
88. See id. at 97 (Noting that Shell’s success is based on its increasing
awareness of the complexity of corporate compliance, communicating about
agreed norms and business rules at the national and international levels of
business ethics, and ultimately encouraging other corporations to implement
reformed practices).
89. See, e.g., Dara O’Rourke, Market Movements: Nongovernmental
Organization Strategiesto Influence Global Production and Consumption, 9 J.
INDUS. ECOLOGY 115, 122 (2005) (discussing how NGOs’ anti-sweatshop
campaigns against Nike encouraged Nike to seek sweatshop solutions and
incorporate new, NGO-suggested practices into its code of conduct).
90. See O’Rourke, supra note 89, at 124–25 (describing the role of NGOs
in corporate accountability, including exposing corporate misdeeds to
consumers, punishing poor performers, monitoring the environmental and
social impacts made by corporations, and promoting broad, long term solutions
capable of transforming the entire market).
91. See generally Lieberman & Asaba, supra note 84, at 366–385
(suggesting that firms imitate one another because they perceive competitors
as having superior information or practices the firms want to incorporate
and/or because the firms strive to remain competitive and limit potential
rivalry).
92. Id. at 367 (noting that several studies have shown that imitation of
superior products, processes, and managerial systems is widely recognized as
a fundamental part of the competitive process).
93. See, e.g., id. at 371 (discussing the major impact that Wal-Mart,
Barnes and Noble, and Amazon had in legitimizing web retail by choosing to
sell their products online; such firms are leaders and others hope to jump on
their successful bandwagons by emulating their past ideas and practices).
94. See e.g., Broadhurst, supra note 68, at 91, 95 (depicting the trend of
social responsibility practices across sectors through the examples of Tommy
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rise of civil regulations among global companies and industries
has provided its own impetus as market participants wish to
avoid losing reputational capital.95
Lastly, even ill-intended modifications in standards often
have substantial and lasting impacts on business practices.96
CSR-type initiatives originating as mere symbolic gestures or
efforts at appeasement may well acquire legitimacy among
global civil society.97
In today’s increasingly transparent global economy,
staffing a CSR office, sending out an annual CSR report,
combining forces with NGOs, signing voluntary industry codes,
and having a chief reputation officer are becoming standard
operating practices for management at global companies that
attract high visibility.98
4. Collaborative Arrangements and Mutli-Stakeholder
Partnerships
Along with self-regulation instruments, transnational
firms are increasingly implementing various CSR mechanisms
and civil regulations geared to numerous collaborative
schemes.99 These kinds of initiatives emerge from crossbreed
devices originating with civil society bodies and business
associations.100 One of the motivations for collaborative
governance is the ability to provide public goods through

Hilfiger in the clothing industry and Shell in the gas, oil, and petrochemical
industry).
95. See Maitland, supra note 83, at 1 (arguing that in an increasingly
complex and risky global supply chain, the world’s largest companies are
seeking strength in numbers and collaborating in areas like labor and
environmental standards to lower the risk of an attack on their individual
reputations).
96. See Lieberman and Asaba, supra note 84, at 381–82 (explaining that
regardless of the motivation for imitation, it continues to permeate corporate
behavior and yield reverberating effects).
97. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 76 TULSA. L. REV. 1431, 1439–41 (2001–2002)
[hereinafter Emerging Norm]; see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational
Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field for
Developing-Country Workers, 53 U. FLA. L. REV. 611, 613–14 (2001).
98. See generally Emerging Norm, supra note 97, at 1431 (discussing the
relationshipbetween corporate social responsibility and human rights
movement).
99. See Albareda, supra note 59, at 435–36 (listing and describing
collaborative CSR methods).
100. See id. at 435–36.
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alliances.101 For example, some civil regulations and civil
regulatory bodies have been instituted with the backing of
trade unions, inter-state organizations, or governments.102
Nevertheless, nation-states do not insist on enforcing
regulations which are not compulsory.103 Instead, states
commonly play the role of intermediaries.104 States extend
assistance to firms, NGOs, and labor unions to find consensus
on mutual standards.105 Through such efforts, states use multistakeholder soft-power to achieve regulatory ends.106
Business-NGO cooperative arrangements have become
more important within the last decade,107 displaying a wide
variety of configurations.108 In addition, an array of regulatory
bodies is undertaking multi-stakeholder projects like the
Ethical Trading Initiative which seeks to promote compliance
with labor guidelines within the context of business supply

101. See Zadek, supra note 20, at 4.
102. See The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
available
at
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/
voluntary_principles_english.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (noting that the
governments of the United States and the United Kingdom assisted companies
in extractive industries in assembling Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights).
103. See generally O’CONNELL, supra note 37, at 110 (explaining the
advantages to nation-states of adopting flexible soft-law solutions that need
not be rigidly enforced).
104. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000) (discussing the post-World War II
involvement of the United States and other nations in setting up multi-lateral
trade negotiation).
105. See id. at 199–200 (describing efforts aimed at reaching consensus).
106. See id. (detailing the ways states involve themselves in trade beyond
hard-law treaties).
107. See Peter Utting, Corporate Responsibility and the Movement of
Business, 15 DEV. PRAC. 375, 384–85 (2005).
108. NGOs like Amnesty International, the Clean Clothes Campaign,
Oxfam, and the World Wildlife Fund team up with trade associations active in
the areas of apparel, cocoa, timber, coffee, mining, and toys, as well as trade
unions, and other organizations like the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and
the International Standards Organization. See Tim Bartley, Institutional
Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private
Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 11 AM. J. SOC. 297, 335
(2007) [hereinafter Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization]. See
also Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements,
and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 3
POL. & SOC’Y 433, 434–35 (2003) (discussing cooperation in the area of forest
management); Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Overlapping Public and Private
Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest
Regime?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 75, 84 (2004).
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chains.109 The growth of these arrangements has given
corporations a role in global public policy networks.110 Global
public policy networks are coalitions linking civil society
organs,
firms,
government
agencies,
international
organizations, NGOs, professional associations, and religious
groups.111 The establishment of standards, development of
regulatory structures, and creation of assessment and
enforcement systems form global public policy networks.112
Companies joining global public policy networks commit to
dialoging with other stakeholders to devise ethical
standards.113 Accountability is difficult without these
monitoring mechanisms.114
For instance, the Global Reporting Initiative is a
partnership of the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (“CERES”) and the United Nations Environmental
Program (“UNEP”), linking firms, governments, media, NGOs,
and professional associations in an effort to establish uniform
reporting standards to assess the organizations’ environmental
and social impacts.115 Signatory firms consent to observe
CERES principles and to preserve and protect the environment
at levels exceeding what local law mandates.116 CERES works
closely with signatory companies to ensure compliance with
core sustainability principles.117
Some Western NGOs perceive co-regulation initiatives as
109. Other multi-stakeholder arrangements include the Forest
Stewardship Council, the Global Reporting Initiative, the Marine Stewardship
Council, and the United Nations Global Compact. See, e.g., About GRI,
GLOBALREPORTING.ORG,
http://www.globalreporting.org/Aboutgri/pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (describing the multistakeholder operations and goals of GRI).
110. David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global
Governance: Modelling Global Public Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321,
321 (2007).
111. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public
Policy Networks, 117 FOREIGN POL’Y 44, 44 (2000). See generally WOLFGANG
H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT?
228 (1998).
112. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 104, at 551.
113. See id. at 159 (noting the historical development of multi-stakeholder
ethics development).
114. See id. at 168–69.
115. See
What
is
GRI,
GLOBALREPORTING.ORG,
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/what-isGRI/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14 2012).
116. See id.
117. See id.
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means of exerting some influence on trends in multinational
corporate behavior.118 Adjusting procurement protocols of mega
enterprises can bring about greater sustainability gains than
enacting numerous national laws and regulations.119 Although
some NGOs stress strategies that “name and shame”
multinational enterprises, others try to team up with
companies and industry associations to establish voluntary
standards and assume an active role in the enforcement of
those standards.120 NGOs’ forming of coalitions with
transnational companies has been instrumental to the creation,
legitimacy, and efficacy of civil regulations.121 A number of
European governments, including the European Union, have
offered substantial support for global CSR.122 Some European
governments implicitly endorse CSR by mandating that
companies trading on their stock exchanges disseminate
annual reports recounting sustainability accomplishments.123
Public pension funds are either encouraged or, at times,
required to take firms’ environmental and social track records
into account in choosing investments.124 Some governments
grant preferences for privately certified merchandise pursuant
118. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 167–68.
119. Christopher McCrudden, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Procurement, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 115–16 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007). See
generally Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance:
How Business and Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules, 18
GOVERNANCE 589, 590 (2005) (describing the shift from public to private
accountability forms).
120. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note
108, at 299–300.
121. See Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, 125 FOREIGN
POL’Y 56, 61 (2001) (discussing the improvements in civil regulation
legitimacy after NGOs became involved); Dennis A. Rondinelli & Ted London,
How Corporations and Environmental Groups Cooperate: Assessing CrossSector Alliances and Collaborations, 1 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 61, 71–72 (2003)
(detailing successful inter-organizational standard compliance mechanisms);
Pattberg, supra note 119, at 591–93.
122. Kristina Herrmann, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable
Development: The European Union Initiative as a Case Study, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 205, 226–27 (2004).
123. See generally Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences
of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting 2–3 (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 11–100, 2012) (discussing the types of quasi-mandatory
reporting).
124. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., PROMOTING
SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: GOOD PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 34
(2008).
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to governments’ procurement policies.125 Various features of
civil regulation resemble characteristically European attitudes
toward business regulation in that they lean heavily on
voluntary agreements and soft-law, often turning to non-state
actors to establish regulatory standards.126 In the eyes of some
European governmental authorities, endorsing global civil
regulations is a convenient way of assuaging home-country
activists and trade unions that may be antagonistic to
globalization and the immense political sway held by
multinational enterprises.127 Nevertheless, this does not serve
to extend sole regulatory authority to states over firms doing
business within their respective jurisdictions.128
One notable benefit of civil regulations as mechanisms of
global business regulation is that their terms are outside the
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) purview, whose
regulations have force only when accepted by national
governments.129 Although the WTO considers governmentmandated eco-labels as potential trade barriers, private

125. See McCrudden, supra note 119, at 112 (explaining how this process
came into being in the United Kingdom after the Labour Party regained power
in the late 1990s).
126. See Jan Willem Biekart, Negotiated Agreements in EU Environmental
Policy, in NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 166
(Jonathan Golub ed., 1998); Olivier Borraz et al., Is It Just About Trust? The
Partial Reform of French Food Safety Regulation, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE
CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 137–39 (Christopher
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006); MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A
EUROPEAN MARKET 263 (2001); Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for
Environmental Policy in the EU: Introduction and Overview, in NEW
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 5, 13–15,(Jonathan
Golub ed., 1998); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Concept of the Network
in European Standard-Setting, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW
AND POLITICS 151, 156–59 (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999); Stephen
Tindale & Chris Hewett, New Enviromental Policy Instruments in the UK, in
NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 52–53 (Jonathan
Golub ed., 1998); Frans van Waarden, Taste, Traditions, and Transactions:
The Public and Private Regulation of Food, in WHAT’S THE BEEF?: THE
CONTESTED GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY 56-57 (Christopher
Ansell & David Vogel eds., 2006).
127. See Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization, supra note
108, at 337.
128. See, e.g., General Information, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last updated Oct.
2012).
129. See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard
Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 575, 577–78 (2008).
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product certifications and labels do not have such a status.130
Similarly, whereas companies may require global suppliers’
compliance with sustainability rules and labor standards as a
prerequisite for transacting business, governments typically
may not condition market access upon such requirements.131
In the case of co-regulation and multi-stakeholder
partnerships, CSR’s focus shifts away from voluntariness and
toward accountability and enforcement mechanisms.132
Accordingly, public accountability mechanisms for private
actors constitute a centerpiece of the emerging global
governance paradigm.133 Global firms use corporate legitimacy
management to shift the role of businesses in society.134
Meanwhile, multi-stakeholder initiatives provide the forum for
a dialogue between business and society—a dialogue that is
required for accountability mechanisms to work.135 Moreover,
involvement in co-regulation and enforcement of multistakeholder devices is connected with the new idea of corporate
citizenship, or what has been termed “political activism.”136
Through these devices, citizens can influence and participate in
dialogue with the conduct of businesses in the sphere of
sustainability and CSR.137
5. Reaction to Regulatory Breakdown
Globalization has been changing the world economic

130. Barbara Fliess et al., CSR and Trade: Informing Consumers About
Social and Environmental Conditions of Globalised Production, ¶¶ 44–46
(Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Working Paper No. 47, 2006).
131. See Vogel, supra note 5, at 169–71 (discussing the divergence of public
and private interests).
132. See Utting, supra note 107, at 381–82.
133. See id. at 383–86 (listing and describing various organizations and
conventions that utilize public accountability mechanisms).
134. See Beverly Kracher & Kelly D. Martin, A Moral Evaluation of Online
Business Protest Tactics and Implications for Stakeholder Management, 114
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 59, 61–64 (2009) (discussing how businesses are managing
corporate image in response to activists’ uses of the internet to protest
“objectionable business practices”).
135. See Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Corporate Legitimacy as
Deliberation: A Communicative Framework, 66 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 77, 82
(2006) (emphasizing the importance of corporate legitimacy).
136. See generally Haufler, supra note 72 (noting that corporate behavior is
not dictated only by profit maximization concerns).
137. See Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Towards an
Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 172–73
(2005) (detailing ways in which corporations interact with people).
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landscape for the past several decades.138 Due to an opening of
outlets for goods in emerging countries and decreased costs of
producing goods, which is in turn a consequence of lowered
labor costs and reduced tax burdens in such countries,
significant changes in manufacturing have occurred.139 As a
result, manufacturing operations have shifted away from
industrialized nations toward developing nations.140 In
addition, global corporations’ production and supply chains
transcend national borders more than ever.141 The bulk of
transnational commerce occurs among firms or inter-firm
networks, so the ascendance of global civil regulation has, in
large part, stemmed from a recognition that globalization
dampens the ability of national legal authorities to effectively
regulate global companies and markets.142 Correspondingly, it
has been noted that although some multinational firms are as
powerful as some small nation-states, they are less
accountable.143
While state and international business regulations are still
growing in range and degree, today’s global economy, while
highly integrated, is plagued by regulatory breakdown144 and a
so-called “orchestration deficit.”145 The transnational character
of global manufacturing strains national governments’
capabilities to control economic activity outside of and
138. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 6–7 (1999).
See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 51–53 (2007) (discussing global capitalism after
the fall of the Berlin Wall).
139. Martin Wolf, Manufacturing at Risk from Global Shift to Asia, FIN.
TIMES, May 23, 2011, at 3.
140. See ARCHIE B. CARROLL & ANN K. BUCHHOLTZ, BUSINESS & SOCIETY:
ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 395 (7th ed. 2008) (observing the
trend for jobs to follow manufacturing).
141. See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 78–79 (1993).
142. See VOGEL, supra note 5, at 162–64 (discussing why civil regulation is
necessary in a globalized world).
143. See Peter Newell, Environmental NGOs and Globalization, in GLOBAL
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 117, 121 (Robin Cohen & Shirin Rai eds., 2000).
144. See Peter Newell, Managing Multinationals: The Governance of
Investment for the Environment, 13 J. INT’L DEV. 907, 908 (2002) (arguing that
the limited scope of civil regulation leads to it being overwhelmed by the
power of international firms).
145. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through “Transnational New Governance, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 501, 544–45 (2009) (describing the need to include more subtle and farreaching trans-national governance).
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straddling their own jurisdictions.146 National and global
regulatory frameworks will remain seriously inadequate so
long as national governments and global business enterprises
remain incapable or ill-disposed to controlling the
sustainability-related facets of international trade. The rise of
civil regulation does not signify an outright replacement of
state regulation.147 Rather, it signifies an attempt to expand
regulation to a broad array of transnational corporate conduct
that remains difficult to regulate via purely national
mechanisms.148 The appearance of new kinds of public civil
regulation has resulted in a type of decentralized “soft law”
accountability, complementing nation-states’ regulations that
have proven inadequate in the era of globalization.149
B. ACCOUNTABILITY
Because of fallout from major industry scandals, the recent
global financial meltdown, and the increasing prevalence of
accountability principles, corporate management is now
implementing
ethical,
transparency,
and
disclosure
standards.150 The need to adopt voluntary civil regulations is
especially strong for firms operating in the global environment.
The traditional concept of legal accountability is
distinguishable from an emerging phenomenon of soft law
accountability.151 The latter is especially intricate because it
entails multifaceted components of accountability.152

146. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at 44.
147. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and
Public Accountability, 34 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234, 234–35 (2004).
148. Id.
149. See Christoph Knill & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Private Actors and the State:
Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governance, 15 GOVERNANCE
41, 44–45 (2002) (discussing the congruence of global problems and global
regulatory structures).
150. Among the names implicated in scandals are Bernard Madoff,
Nicholas Leeson, Enron, WorldCom, Aldelphia, Arthur Anderson, and Tyco.
See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A
Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 707 (2002).
See also Note, The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2123, 2126 (2003); Brian A. Warwick, Commentary, Reinventing the
Wheel: Firestone and the Role of Ethics in the Corporation, 54 ALA. L. REV.
1455, 1466–71 (2003).
151. Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and
Reputational Accountability, 35:1 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41 (2010).
152. Id.
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1. Hard Versus Soft Law Accountability
Legal accountability means that normative regulatory
standards are enforceable.153 Compliance with black-letter legal
rules creates a presumption of validity in the eyes of judicial
tribunals or quasi-judicial forums.154 The notion of legal
accountability stems from the rule of law maxim. A vast body of
civil and criminal law has developed to hold non-profit and forprofit institutions legally accountable.155 In the international
sphere, the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Hague
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and International
Criminal Court are all institutions that undertake the
enforcement of “hard” international law.156
As was the case with early international law phenomena,
civil regulations lacking hard enforcement mechanisms
function as normative standards and are intended to induce
compliance.157 To the extent that corporations comply with soft
law, it is not because they are deterred by enforcement
sanctions but rather because they are interested in building or

153. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses
of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 36 (2005) (discussing the
requirement that individuals and entities be held to formal rules).
154. Cf. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 11 (1967) (analyzing norm
validity and asserting that if norms are not actually followed, they lack
validity).
155. See Christine Parker, supra note 8, at 208–15 (discussing metaregulation in hard-law applications); see also Alnoor Ebrahim, Making Sense
of Accountability: Conceptual Perspectives for Northern and Southern
Nonprofits, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 191, 194–95 (2003) (detailing
the legal need to meet prescribed standards of behavior).
156. Concerning violence and nation-states, substantial changes have come
about in international standards, practices, and institutions. War crimes
tribunals and the International Criminal Court were set up to hold heads of
states perpetrating acts of violence against their own citizenry accountable.
Developments like this signal a significant departure from customary norms
governing the principle of national sovereignty. That principle extended
immunity to heads of states from legal petitions for accountability, save from
members of their own principalities. Indeed, an inaugural precept of the
nation-state system, acknowledged from Westphalia in 1648 to Nuremberg in
1946, held that heads of states were immune from prosecution. See generally
Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can
Put Tyrants on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 649, 650 (2005).
157. But see Terry Nardin, Theorizing the International Rule of Law, 34
REV. INT’L STUD. 385, 389 (2008) (citing Thomas M. Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power
Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88 (2006)) (noting that compliance with
international law is a result of a desire for legitimacy).

JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013))

96

2/21/2013 1:48 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

preserving their intangible reputational assets.158 Arguably, a
régime of global civil regulations and their attendant informal,
decentralized modes of enforcement constitute an integral part
of both the domestic and international rule of law. However,
they are often ignored by commentators because they are only
backed by “soft” sanctions, the nature and extent of which are
not well understood.159
A deeper look into the various sources of soft law shows
how intricate, complex, and subtle they can be. Global civil
regulations often represent the result of compromises reached
among private and public entities.160 Instead of imposing cost of
compliance with formal regulations, civil regulations encourage
corporations to scrutinize their conduct and guide it with
voluntary self-regulation.161 While global civil regulations are
subject to rapid change and are continually evolving, national
law, dependent on its institutions to act, takes longer to
evolve.162
Yet, from the standpoint of the conventional rule of law
maxim and its experience, voluntary CSR appears deficient.
CSR is decentralized, carries conflicting norms, is orchestrated
by unelected activists, business executives, and bureaucrats,163
158. See GÖRAN AHRNE & NILS BRUNSSON, Soft Regulation from an
Organizational Perspective, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION
171, 187–89 (Ulrika Mörth ed., 2004).
159. See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common
Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 519, 52223 (2009) (contending that reputational effects of following or forgoing soft law
are difficult to anticipate and remain elusive).
160. David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 16:3 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 261, 270 (Dec. 30, 2007).
161. But see Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL.
MGMT. REV., 132, 132-33 (1985) (arguing that self-regulation is ineffective
because profit maximization is often at odds with compliance, thus
compromising the validity).
162. KEVIN T. JACKSON, BUILDING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL 38 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2004) (“The idea is that the law [of soft law] resides in the actual
judgment given, not in any crisp preexisting formulation in a statute or case
precedent.”). A major task that companies face is accurately forecasting what
these non-legal and unelected accountability-holders may be expecting from
them. Whereas the authoritative sources of law applied and enforced by courts
of law are generally recognized by members of the legal community, it remains
unclear precisely what sources of “soft law” are applied by accountabilityholders. Consider the adage that the job of judges is to prophesize what courts
will do. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 457–58 (1897).
163. From this standpoint, the rise of global governance raises questions
about the legitimacy of the actors attempting to hold transnational firms
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and does not employ any hard sanctions that can be
administered following non-compliance.164 Accountability
means that actors can ensure that other actors follow
standards, and that actors may apply sanctions for noncompliance with those standards.165 In the context of global
economic governance, civil regulations that bear upon firms’
moral deportment arguably represent the strongest form of soft
law sanctions, because firms’ reputations are one of their most
valuable assets.166
2. Components of Soft Law Accountability
The process of corporate soft law accountability involves a
triad of elements.167 First, soft law accountability presupposes
the existence of civil regulations that hold companies
accountable; compliance is expected.168 Like the rule of law
maxim saying that the law must be knowable—for example,
that it must be published so that citizens are aware of the
rights and responsibilities given or imposed upon them by
law—civil regulations must also be matters of common
knowledge.169 Second, soft law accountability demands that
enforcement agents possess relevant information about firms’
accountable. The theory of rent seeking proceeds from the hypothesis that the
priority of typical bureaucrats are to advance their own self-interest.
Consequently, if restraints of accountability and election are removed,
bureaucrats become owners of rents, with the power to potentially raise these
rents at the expense of those for whom the resources are supposed to benefit.
United Nations institutions provide substantial income for the politicians and
bureaucrats that control them, and that the objectives for which they were set
up are absorbing ever smaller portions of their internal budgets. See generally
ROSEMARY RIGHTER, UTOPIA LOST: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD
ORDER 56–63 (1995).
164. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels,
One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote
Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 395, 400–01 (2004).
165. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, supra note 153, at 29.
166. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational
Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J. L. & ECON. 757,
758-59 (1993) (noting that the majority of falling stock price in the wake of
corporate malfeasance, whether proven or not, is attributable to reputational
loss whereas anticipated legal sanctions, including fines and damage awards,
comprise as little as 6.5% of the decline in share value).
167. See generally Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in
World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1123-24 (2003)
(illustrating the power dimensions of accountability demands).
168. See id. at 1123.
169. See id.
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actions to evaluate compliance with applicable civil
regulations.170 On the one hand, firms must be aware of
expectations before they can be held accountable for them.171
On the other hand, enforcement agents must know by what
standards to render an assessment of business conduct.172
Because accurate information is vital, at least some
transparency and dialogue among stakeholders appears to be a
prerequisite for soft law accountability.173 Third, soft law
accountability
requires
incentives
for
compliance.174
Enforcement agents must be able to impose informal sanctions
or rewards. To be sure, no worldwide government, democratic
or otherwise, exists to provide wholesale regulation.175
Demands for corporate accountability are therefore
decentralized and diffused.176
3. Enforcement from Informal Evaluation
Whereas the concept of legal accountability derives its
central meaning from the notion of the rule of law, the concept
of soft law accountability may be understood in terms of market
participants’ informal evaluations of business conduct. For
example, individual investors and mutual funds may cease
investing in companies with objectionable practices or
policies.177 Some pension funds shun securities of certain
170. See id. at 1124 (discussing the need of information in order to
effectively hold one accountable).
171. See Alasdair B. Ross, Reputation: Risk of Risks, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENT UNIT, December 2005, at 1, 11.
172. See id. at 4-5.
173. See generally Pamela Stapleton & David Woodward, Stakeholder
Reporting: The Role of Intermediaries, 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 183, 184 (2009)
(noting the important role of dialogue with and among stakeholders).
174. See Keohane, supra note 167, at 1123–24 (arguing that the notion of
accountability involves both the sharing of information regarding actions,
decisions, or behavior of some kind and the exercise of sanctions).
175. See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRACY PAST AND FUTURE 192–93
(Samuel Moyn ed., 2006) (noting that a diffraction of conventional modes of
representative democracy and a widespread suspicion of politics are occurring
across the planet). Such developments increase the number of political
players, diffusing political legitimacy. “We are moving bit by bit to more
disseminated forms of civil democracy,” an “indirect democracy,” created by
“whole congeries of efforts—through informal social movements but
institutions too—intended to compensate for the erosion of trust by
institutionalizing distrust.” Id. at 235-238. Indirect democracy is engaged in
the deployment of “mechanisms of oversight, the creation of independent
institutions, and the formation of powers of rejection.” Id. at 239.
176. Jackson, supra note 85, at 244.
177. See, e.g., Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional
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companies on the basis of criteria determined by the pension
funds’ beneficiaries.178 Investors may require higher interest
rates on corporate bonds.179 Customers may decline to purchase
products produced by firms struck by negative publicity
stemming from human rights violations, unfair labor practices,
or environmental violations.180 Some consumers are willing to
incur added costs, like the cost of traveling farther, to punish
retailers whose conduct they find egregiously unfair.181 Those
in employment markets may select among competing job offers
on the basis of the prospective employer’s publicity and
reputation.182
Business partners and associates comprise another type of
forum for the evaluation of conduct.183 This forum functions as
a peer-driven accountability network powered by the process of
business partners’ reciprocal appraisals.184 Institutional
lenders, for instance, use caution in scrutinizing their
borrowers’ creditworthiness as well as that of their partners’
borrowers.185 Business enterprises rated low by their peers are
less likely to find willing business partners among them.186
These businesses find themselves in a strategic disadvantage
and therefore tend to stagnate.187
Next is the legendary “court of public opinion.”188 Members
of civil society penalize business enterprises by spreading
Owners and Corporate Social Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1034, 1034
(1994). See also Kristin Friedery, Core Innovation Collaboration Success
Stories,
CORE
CATALYST,
(August
19,
2011,
9:32
AM),
http://corecolorado.org/success-stories?mode=PostView&bmi=680022.
178. See R. Bruce Hutton, Louis D’Antonio & Tommi Johnsen, Socially
Responsible Investing: Growing Issues and New Opportunities, 37 BUS. &
SOC’Y. 281, 287-88 (1998).
179. Layna Mosley, GLOBAL CAPITAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 18
(2003).
180. See Deborah Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom line, 77 FOREIGN
AFF. 7, 9 (1998).
181. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as
a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
728, 735–36 (1986).
182. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 13.
183. Grant & Keohane, supra 153.
184. Id. at 35 (“When standards are not legalized, we would expect
accountability to operate chiefly through reputation and peer pressures,
rather than in more formal ways.”).
185. JACKSON, supra note 162, at 13.
186. Id. at 14.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 36.
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negative publicity.189 Legislators, jurists, regulators, fiscal
watchdogs, newscasters, competitors, licensing bureaus, rating
agencies, and markets all decree informal judgments about the
reputations of market participants.190 In fact, such judgments
seem to constitute a type of “soft power,” which has been
characterized as the ability to shape the preferences of
others.191 Companies with tarnished names find it hard to
establish relationships, assert authority, or attract loyalty from
others.192
4. Dispersed Networks of Accountability
Accountability in global economic governance is
multifaceted and decentralized. Global companies operate
within networks of continuous relationships.193 Firms are
linked with their customers, suppliers, and rivals through
strategic alliances.194 When companies enter into arrangements
with parties like government regulators and special interest
groups, they are establishing “soft law networks.”195 These soft
law networks form channels of accountability which are divided
by and cover a range of topical areas.196 On the other hand,
189. STEVEN HERZ ET AL., DEVELOPMENT
BUSINESS CASE FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT 14

WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE
(Jonathan Sohn ed. 2007)
(“Reputation risk is the current and prospective impact on earnings and
capital arising from negative public opinion.”).
190. For an example of a newscaster making an informal judgment about
Nike’s reputation, see Simon Birch, How activism forced Nike to change its
ethical
game,
GREENLIVING
BLOG
(July
6,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/green-livingblog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike.
191. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 5 (2004).
192. Tammy Higginbotham, Unethical Behaviors and Their Effect on Small
Business, YAHOO! VOICES (Oct. 3, 2010), http://voices.yahoo.com/unethicalbehaviors-their-effect-small-business-6904236.html.
193. HAKAN HAKANSSON & IVAN SNEHOTA, DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS IN
BUSINESS NETWORKS 10 (Hakan Hakansson & Ivan Snehota eds., Routledge,
1995).
194. See Nye, supra note 191.
195. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The Institutional
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS.
L. J. 37, 97 (defining “soft law networks” as means by which information can
be shared and cooperation can be facilitated).
196. See, e.g., id. at 53 (“Though the discussions have shifted to less
contentious topics within the antitrust and international trade interface,
market access issues remain one of the core difficulties that arise in this
interface. The ability of antitrust institutions to address issues that interface
with other areas of law has become increasingly relevant in a globalized world
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relationships involving international organizations typically
establish sequences of accountability.197 In addition, multiple
intersecting accountability relationships exist when different
groups of market participants with potentially diverse interests
set out to hold other agents accountable for their behaviors.198
Within the contemporary business environment, companies
confront many and frequently incompatible accountability
demands.199 Sometimes it is not enough to satisfy the demands
of shareholders and credit markets.200 Merely complying with
legal rules is often insufficient because the law typically trails
behind quickly evolving social norms.201 Businesses must
remain mindful of their constituencies’—peers, media, and
advocacy groups—reactions to their actions.202
C. CONCEPT OF RULE OF LAW
In the interest of gaining a philosophical perspective, it is
necessary to distinguish two methods of framework analysis.
One method involves discussing the actual working
arrangements that constitute global economic governance from
the perspective of practitioners.203 The second method involves
economy. Shortcomings of antitrust in addressing the effects of trade
distortions threaten to limit the potential gains of trade liberalization.”).
197. See Keohane, supra note 167, at 1124 (noting that in a common
accountability sequence, an agent will be authorized by a given accountability
relationship but yet another such relationship will restrict it; for example, the
International Accounting Standards Board holds companies responsible for
accounting practices, yet it is itself accountable to the entities granting
authority to it, namely the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions).
198. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Barbosa, Note, Implementation of the DOHA
Declaration: Its Impact on American Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 205,
207–211 (2004) (citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994))
(giving the example that the WTO and the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement both attempt to hold multinational
pharmaceutical companies accountable, yet shareholders of the
pharmaceutical companies also hold firms accountable).
199. See Ross, supra note 171, at 11-13.
200. See id. at 7-8.
201. See Carol & Buchholtz, supra note 140, at 41.
202. See Jackson, supra note 162, at 109 (providing examples about how
U.S. West was criticized for by gay-rights advocates when it contributed to the
Boy Scouts of America and how Dayton-Hudson was criticized for supporting
Planned Parenthood).
203. For an example of a work discussing the actual working arrangements
that constitute global economic governance, see MAKING GLOBAL TRADE
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abstracting from existing arrangements and theorizing about
the idea of global economic governance as an order.204
Abstracting in this context is similar to abstracting from the
existing international legal system and theorizing about the
concept of international law.205
While the actual global governance schemes discussed in
the preceding section represent contingent political and
commercial arrangements, this section of the article is geared
toward abstracting these contingent features in order to
examine the presuppositions of global governance as an idea. In
particular, the concern is how that idea relates to the concept of
the rule of law.
While global governance may indeed possess numerous
beneficial features—among them is the promotion of more
responsible competitiveness across global markets206—
questions remain about its capabilities to protect and promote
the international rule of law, which presupposes some deeper
authoritativeness. It is therefore necessary to clarify the
concept of international rule of law and discuss the significance
of that idea as it pertains to the moral authority of global
governance régimes.
The legitimacy of traditional international law and
emergent approaches to global governance may be analyzed
from a variety of standpoints on a theoretical level.207 As a
threshold matter, determining whether to regard law in
instrumental or non-instrumental terms, or in some
combination of the two, must be made.208

GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011).
204. See generally DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS 84 (Blackwell
Publishers & Harv. Univ. Press 1973) (“Ordinary language permits the
paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they
actually are.”).
205. See Nardin, supra note 26, at 389.
206. See Zadek & Mcillivray, supra note 19.
207. See APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY (Martin Hewson
& Timothy J. Sinclair eds., State Univ. of N.Y. Press, 1999) (identifying three
approaches: (1) the use of global governance as a way to enhance the work of
international organizations, (2) a revision of regime theory, and (3) a
normative approach).
208. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, Symposium on Method
in International Law: The Method Is the Message, 93 AM. J. INT’L L., 410, 410
(1999) (noting that one way of addressing international law questions is the
instrumentalist versus non-instrumentalist approach).
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1. Instrumental Versus Non-Instrumental Viewpoints of
Law
The non-instrumental conception of law holds that the
content of law is, in some sense, given; that law is immanent;
that the process of law-making is not a matter of creation but
one of discovery; that law is not the product of human will; that
law has a kind of autonomy and internal integrity; and that
law is, in some sense, objectively determined.209
By contrast, the instrumental view of law holds that law is
an instrumental process determined by non–legal factors, and
its legitimacy comes from its ability to serve social purposes.210
This instrumental conception of law is labeled as
“pragmatism.”211
One source of skepticism toward the concept of an
international rule of law that is also a potential source of
optimism toward global governance comes from scholars who
view the concept of law in strictly instrumental terms.212
Whether one is considering a domestic or international context,
all that law can ever amount to is policy.213 The instrumental
view conceives of the nature of law as simply a decision process
rather than a coherent system of rules.214 To the extent that
law engages rules, it does so only to promote the utilitarian
objective of generating desired outcomes.215 The authority of
such norms stems from their effectiveness in realizing such

209. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END:
RULE OF LAW 11 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

THREAT TO THE

210. Brian Tamanaha, On the Instrumental View of Law in American Legal
Culture 4 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper Series
Paper No. 08-0143, Aug. 2011).
211. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 152 (Harvard Univ. Press,
1986). See also KEVIN T. JACKSON, CHARTING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Am., 1994) (applying
the pragmatist conception of law to the international context).
212. Hent Kalmo, How Comparable Are Legal Concepts? The Case of
Causation, XI JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 45, 52 (2006) (listing Basil
Markesinis as a scholar adopting an openly instrumental view of legal
vocabulary).
213. Allen Bunchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 306–308 (2006) (noting that some states
only use the instrumental theory of international law when such use is to their
advantage).
214. Kalmo, supra note 212 (noting that Basil Markesinis claims that tort
law concepts are words to help phrase decisions).
215. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Hackett Publishing
Company 2001).
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outcomes.216
By contrast, non-instrumental norms are those which
ought to be respected for their own sake, apart from some
desired result.217 An example of a non-instrumental norm at
the heart of the rule of law and human rights is one prescribing
that because citizens are related to each other as moral equals,
they have a right to be treated as equals.218 Likewise, the
familiar requirements of the rule of law such as nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali that serve as restraints on
arbitrariness, limiting what authorities can do and how they go
about doing it, are all of a non-instrumental character.219
The existence of non-instrumental norms is what enables a
distinction between just and unjust uses of force or coercion.
While non-instrumental norms are similar to moral
principles,220 they are nevertheless internal to law.
2. Radical Skepticism
Another view, skeptical of the rule of law maxim, comes
from postmodernist portrayals of law. 221 Radical skeptics of
law reject the notion of law as a coherent foundation for human
coordination and collaboration.222 For instance, “[r]ights
discourse is internally inconsistent, vacuous, or circular. Legal
216. See id.
217. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, STANFORD ENCYC. PHIL. (Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Spring
2009),
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/egalitarianism/.
218. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1977).
219. See Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal
Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
77, 109-110 (Spring 2009) (“[P]rocedural and substantive justice are connected
and not separate... this still allows that fair procedures have values intrinsic
to them - for example, a procedure having the value of impartiality by giving
all an equal chance to present their case”) (quoting John Rawls, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 421-23 (1993)).
220. See RICHARD MADSEN & TRACY B. STRONG, THE MANY AND THE ONE:
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL PLURALISM IN THE
MODERN WORLD 118 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) (“A non-instrumental
conception of . . . norms as commonly agreed upon moral principles is surely
possible.”).
221. See, e.g., Thomas Diez & Jill Steans, A Useful Dialogue? Hebermas
and International Relations, 31 REV. INT’L STUD. 127 (2005) (noting that the
Habermas-style ethical model of dialogue and mutual recognition could
support collaborative governance).
222. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for
Heirarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 40, 48 (David Kairys ed., Pantheon ed.,
1982).
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thought can generate equally plausible rights justifications for
almost any result.”223 Also, legal principles are both logically
incoherent and normatively unattractive.224 Challenging the
very idea of rule of law, John Hasnas writes:
I refer to the myth of the rule of law
because, to the extent this phrase suggests a
society in which all are governed by neutral
rules . . . there is no such thing. As a myth,
however, the concept of the rule of law is both
powerful and dangerous. Its power derives from
its great emotive appeal. The rule of law
suggests an absence of arbitrariness, an absence
of the worst abuses of tyranny.
Because the law is made up of contradictory
rules that can generate any conclusion, what
conclusion one finds will be determined by what
conclusion one looks for, i.e., by the hypothesis
one decides to test. This will invariably be the
one that intuitively “feels” right, the one that is
most congruent with
one’s
antecedent,
underlying political and moral beliefs. Thus,
legal conclusions are always determined by the
normative assumptions of the decision maker.225
It should be noted in response to the radical skeptics that
any world view denying the possibility of objective moral truth
within the context of domestic legal orders cannot, a fortiori,
serve to justify an international rule of law.226 That is because
the rule of law presupposes deliberative procedures for
rendering decisions that establish obligations in the context of
some legally ordered community.227 In this sense the rule of law
applied to the global realm makes sense only if certain
universal ideas are assumed: Kant’s concept of a human person
223. Id.
224. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING 95-98 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
225. John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 199 WIS. L. REV. 199, 201
(1995).
226. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61
DUKE L. REV. 775, 789 (citing Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner
and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005)) (responding to skeptics and
defending independent tribunals and quasi-judicial review bodies as
mechanisms of the international rule of law).
227. Id.
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as a member of a universal legal and moral community, and the
notion of a cosmopolitan democracy.228
The more general and abstract norms become, the more
indeterminate their application will be.229 If one assumes that
the rule of law requires certainty, predictability, consistency,
and non-contradiction, then the unavoidable dependence of
global governance régimes on general and abstract norms for
setting out sustainability guidelines and human rights
standards seems to call the rule of law into question. Is it
therefore illusory to attempt to associate global governance
with the rule of law? If one is committed to an ideal like the
rule of law, there must be continual effort to separate authentic
from inauthentic and legitimate from illegitimate.230 In
actuality, there is no final attainment of the rule of law,
whether in advanced domestic legal systems or in emerging
global governance régimes. Analogously, there is no final
accomplishment of practical rationality for human persons.
Instead, the notions of practical rationality and rule of law are
both regulative ideals that need to be continuously tracked.231
In this regard, radical legal skeptics cling to a constitutive
conception of rule of law.232 On this account, the rule of law is
simply a characteristic patterned upon existing epistemological
imperfections in legal orders, whether from rules or decision
makers, the skeptics choose to criticize. The radical skeptics of
law flatly deny the possibility of a legal system with the
capability of rooting out the imperfections and correcting them.
The conception advanced in this article is regulative, not
constitutive. This means that the rule of law is understood as a
228. See DANIELE ARCHIBUGI, THE GLOBAL COMMONWEALTH OF CITIZENS:
TOWARD COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 119–20 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2008).
229. See BENJAMIN GREENWOOD GREGG, COPING IN POLITICS WITH
INDETERMINATE NORMS: A THEORY OF ENLIGHTENED LOCALISM 28 (SUNY
Press, 2003) (“Because of their abstract character, norms are incapable of
specifying what to do in every contingency and must be defined in terms of the
occasions of their application; this is their core ambiguity.”).
230. Contra Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the
Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1123, 1124 (1997) (discussing the “impossibility of distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate legal rules”).
231. See Michael Sean Quinn, Symposium on Taking Legal Argument
Seriously: Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
655, 775 (arguing that regulative ideals are involved in the concept of rule of
law).
232. JOHN BRIGHAM, MATERIAL LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF WHAT’S REAL
(Temple University Press 2009).
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regulative principle mandating that global governance
institutions and actors seek to make the standards arising from
global governance schemes increasingly clear, consistent, fair,
reasonable, and to maintain such public standards with
intensifying commitments. From the standpoint of the
regulative conception, any contradictions or inconsistencies
that might be detected and seized upon by the radical skeptics
would only serve as further inducements for pursuing the rule
of law, as incentives for making the ideal more of a reality.
3. Implied Components of Legality
The rise of global economic governance syndicates leads to
questions like whether and to what extent such régimes,
particularly those that are “enforced” by sporadic and vicious
“naming and shaming” campaigns of self-appointed activists
who may deploy unscrupulous “dirty” political tactics, can
reasonably be said to embody the rule of law, and what this
might suggest in terms of their legal and moral authority.233
Reference to the fundamental presuppositions of legality is
illuminating. Basic implied elements constitute the “internal
morality” of law or “the morality that makes law possible.”234
Some implied elements include the existence of rules as
opposed to ad hoc declarations, publicity, non-retroactivity,
understandability, non-contradiction, capability of compliance,
temporal constancy, and congruence between official behavior
and rules.235 This underscores key questions raised earlier: to
what extent do global business civil regulations at play in
global governance mechanisms display a fidelity to such noninstrumental and unwritten characteristics of legality? Are
civil regulations dominated by instrumental objectives in
promoting liberal policies?
Another feature of the rule of law that warrants discussion
233. A central concern of legal philosophers since the middle of the
twentieth century has been the nature of the rule of law. Arguably one reason
for this concern was the rise and decline of totalitarian governments.
Following the demise of Nazism, philosophers of law put their theories of law
to test, in the famous Hart-Fuller debates, for example, with questions like
whether the Hitler’s regime could meaningfully be deemed a legal system. See,
e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1957). See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957).
234. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (Yale Univ. Press 1964).
235. See id. (discussing implied elements which constitute the internal
morality of law).
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is its implied concern for the well-being of citizens standing in
special relation to whomever undertakes to govern them. The
rule of law ordains that citizens stand in relation to one
another as members of a community.236 This is called the
“community of principle.”237
A community of citizens situated under a rule of law enjoys
entitlements to pursue their freely chosen ends without
interference, save when needed to restrain them from
interference with each other’s freedom.238
4. “Publicness”
It is important to address the relationship between the rule
of law and the multiplicity of “publics” relevant to the idea of a
common public justification. In collaborative governance, a
substantial part of the process of rulemaking connected with
human rights standards is remote from any strictly democratic
process.239 The ideas of the rule of law and human rights,
however, presuppose the existence of some group of persons—
some public—in whose name the law stands. According to the
rule of law, legal norms must be representative of the entire
society and be addressed to issues of concern to society per se,
rather than merely pertaining to matters of personal interest to
people or groups that create the rules.240
Because “publicness” is related to the democratic process of
law-making,241 there are limits to this being realized at the
international level. There is no global democracy in place on
earth, after all.242 Although collaborative governance tends to
236. Dworkin, supra note 211, at 211.
237. Id.
238. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom and Prosperity 3 (George
Mason Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
02-20).
239. See Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Democracy in Global
Governance 12 (CSGR Working Paper No. 65/01, 2001) (“Governance of global
spaces is not only different, but also lacks democratic legitimacy.”).
240. See Jeremy Waldron, Can There be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, 58
EMORY L.J. 675, 700 (2009).
241. Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, From Bilateralism to
Publicness in International Law 79, 85 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Working Papers, Working Paper No. 256, 2011), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1260&context=nyu_plltwp.
242. See Boris Kagarlitsky, Global Democracy Through National
Democracy,
BUILDING
GLOBAL
DEMOCRACY,
http://www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org/ content/east-europe-and-central-asia
(last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (noting that “no global democratic political process
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extend the range of actors involved in formulating rules, there
appears to be no immediate likelihood that transnational
collaborative governance will institute processes that closely
resemble democratic procedures within states.243
As more and more sector-based and non-state agents
assume roles in collaborative governance régimes, the question
of whether such parties are authentic representatives of “the
public” carrying authority over human rights matters naturally
arises. This in turn raises the question of whether a
purportedly “public” entity is really a genuine representative of
a relevant public. It also raises the question of whether it
makes sense to speak of a decision, along with the rules and
principles upon which it is rendered, as standing in the name of
an entire community, speaking to that entire community when
it may in fact be addressed to a narrower group.244
5. The Concept of a Regulative Principle
Kant’s concept of a regulative principle or ideal helps
clarify the meaning of rule of law in the global governance
context.245 In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant set forth to
establish what we know and how we can know it.246 Kant
demonstrated the way society’s observation of the world must
be bound together and organized on the basis of certain basic
ideas and concepts.247 These basic concepts, such as the idea of
cause and effect, shape people’s knowledge and understanding.
Kant argued that some ideals are unattainable but still serve
key functions.248 Among such ideas are those of truth,
goodness, and beauty.249 People’s efforts to approach such
ideals exert a profound influence on their actions, and people’s
regard for them plays a vital role in the way people accept some
can develop unless it is based on serious democratic change at the national
and local levels.”).
243. Robert Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A
Skeptic’s View, 19 DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19–36 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano
Hacker-Cordon eds., Cambridge Univ. Press1999).
244. See Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, in
NOMOS XLIX: MORAL UNIVERSALISM AD PLURALISM 174 (Henry R. Richardson
& Melissa S. Williams eds., N.Y. Univ. Press, 2009).
245. Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., 1929).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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views and reject others.250
Kant sets forth the notion of a regulative principle, which
as an ideal is a specific, singular concept that exemplifies the
perfection of some action, process, or object.251 For instance, an
ideal legal order would be fair,252 treat all citizens as equals,253
and resolve disputes254 in an objective and enlightened way. It
is not possible for a regulative principle to actually be realized
in the course of actual events.255 Consequently, critics of Kant’s
philosophy attack it for laying emphasis upon states of affairs
that are inaccessible or unattainable.256 However, such a
charge does not appreciate the role that ideas play in
constituting the possibility of understanding reality in the first
place.
A principle is considered regulative rather than
constitutive when it is unachievable but is able to guide,
balance, and mediate people’s actions in practical matters. A
regulative principle constitutes an ideal to aim for, by which
people are put in a position to measure their progress.257 By
250. George Miller, Reading Revolutions: Intellectual History: Emerson’s
Optimism,
available
at
http://hua.umf.maine.edu/Reading_Revolutions/Emerson.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012) (“Our only access to truth, goodness, or to life itself, is through
our own understanding and our own judgments.”).
251. Id.
252. John Tasioulas, International Law and the Limits of Fairness, 13:4
EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2002).
253. See Douglas J. Amy, Government as the Champion of Justice,
Equality,
Freedom,
and
Security,
GOVERNMENT
IS
GOOD,
http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=12&p=1 (last visited Oct.
10, 2012).
254. See Robert S. Done, Resolving Conflict Within the Organization:
Creating “Win-Win” Solutions with Mediation, SOC’Y INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL.,
INC., available at http://www.siop.org/tip/backissues/tipjan99/3Done.aspx (last
visited Oct. 10, 2012) (noting that although litigation, which relies on the legal
order to resolve disputes, is common today, other methods of dispute
resolution may also be useful).
255. Garth Kemerling, Kant: Experience and Reality, THE PHILOSOPHY
PAGES, http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm (last modified Nov. 12,
2011) (“The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes it
impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can in no way
diminish the depth fo [sic] our belief that they are.”).
256. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Connecting Business Ethics and Legal Ethics
for the Common Good: Come, Let Us Reason Together, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 469,
500 (2004) (criticizing Kant’s notion of fairness because “as general critics of
Kant have long noted, it may not be possible to show how fairness itself is
universally binding, in and of itself, on all conscientious people.”).
257. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A674/B702 (Norman
Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin’s Press 1929) (arguing that regulative

JACKSON - Global Economic Governance (22 MINN J INTL L 71 (Winter 2013))

2013]

GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

2/21/2013 1:48 PM

111

contrast, constitutive principles dictate how things must be and
come about from people’s insight into their essential nature.258
Within the ideal realm, Kant contends that separate ideals
do not necessarily contradict one another.259 Thus, people may
go in pursuit of multiple ideals negotiated alongside each other.
Because, however, people do not live in an ideal realm, conflicts
among ideals arise.260
6. Received View of Rule of Law
The problem of reaching an adequate account of the rule of
law is among the most important issues that global governance
and international law must address.
Among the various interpretations of the rule of law, the
more widely accepted interpretations range across the so-called
“thin” versus “thick” spectrum, accompanied also by the “ruleby-law” idea.261 At one end of the spectrum, the “thin” or
“formal” conception holds that the rule of law possesses only
some minimal formal characteristics like the requirements that
law must be publicly declared, have only prospective
application, and be imbued with the attributes of generality,
equality, and a reasonable degree of certainty or
predictability.262 Beyond that, except for sharing an opposition
to the arbitrary exercise of power, “thin” conceptions do not
principles come into play in reconciling conflicts that come up for reason with
themselves, and that regulative principles stem from people’s interests in
gaining a certain possible perfection).
258. For further development of the regulative-constitutive distinction, see
JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 178 (1995)
(explaining how some rules, like those of the game of chess, not only regulate
the activity but also function to constitute it).
259. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(1797).
260. See NICOLAS RESCHER, ETHICAL IDEALISM 125 (1987) (arguing that an
ideal constitutes a “component within a system, which makes it possible to
strike a reasonable balance between the different and potentially discordant
values.”).
261. See generally Robert, J. Barro, Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic
Performance,
INDEX
OF
ECONOMIC
FREEDOM,
available
at
http://www.geser.net/Barro.pdf (providing an example of another account, one
asserting that the rule of law constitutes a set of ideals that protect political
arrangements like democracy or promote economic arrangements like free
market capitalism).
262. See generally Thom Ringer, Development, Reform, and the Rule of
Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the "Rule of Law“
and its Place in Development Theory and Practice (June 7, 2007) (unpublished
note)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/ringer.pdf.
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attribute any particular requirements regarding the content of
law.263 At the other end of the spectrum, “thick” or
“substantive” conceptions deem the rule of law to entail
protections for individual rights and to incorporate substantive
considerations of justice.264 Under the “rule-by-law” conception,
the idea of the rule of law stands in contrast to the
discretionary rule of men which is associated with abuse of
power by government officials.265
Regarding the thin and thick distinction, it may be helpful
to understand it in the way that mathematics treats
dimensions. The multidimensional character of the rule of law
can be acknowledged, noting that the thicker conceptions differ
from the thinner ones by virtue of additional “coordinates”
being added. As one moves to a “higher” (“thicker”) dimension,
the “lower” (“thinner”) dimensions remain intact. This is
another way of expressing the point that “[s]ubstantive theories
are typically built on the back of formal ones.”266 In making
comparisons amongst the various candidate conceptions, it is
good to remember that the admonition that a “common critique
of those who claim to articulate ‘thin’ theories is that
substantive elements have been included by stealth.”267
This article contends that a rule of law obtains only where
actions, including not only those acts of sovereign states and
their agents but also those of diverse economic actors in
international institutions, are constrained by the regulative
idea of law.
This raises the challenging question of what law is.268 For
263. See generally id.
264. See generally id.
265. See BRIAN TAMANAHA, supra note 14 (“Stripped of all technicalities,
this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and
announced before-hand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances
and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”) (quoting
FREIDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1994)).
266. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
331, 341 (2008) (citing Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF
LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE US 1, 5–6 (Randall
Peerenboom ed., 2004)).
267. Id. (citing Peerenboom’s suggestion that the thin versus thick
conceptions may be visualized as concentric circles, with the inner circle
containing core components of a thin rule of law and itself embedded within a
thick rule of law framework).
268. David Howarth, On the Question, “What Is Law?” 6:3 RES PUBLICA
259 (2000).
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the instant purpose, it is useful to clarify the function of
international law. First, international law’s function is to
attain an end state which is desired by those whose conduct is
placed under the authority of law.269 Second, international law
functions to bring about justice within a wide array of instances
of human, state, and institutional interaction.270 One persistent
threat is the detachment of this key function of international
law from the non-instrumental concept of law and the tendency
to instead view law purely as an instrument for policy, used to
impose the will of the more powerful components of the
international order (whether sovereign states, powerful
multinational corporations, the ultra-rich, and so on).271 Third,
international law functions to resolve transnational political,272
economic,273 and social conflicts.274 It does this by establishing
coherent boundaries as to what conduct people, states, and
institutions can come to expect from one another.275 In this
way, international law continually evolves by providing ways to
establish a state of equilibrium in response to deviations from
the norms that have been established.
The rule of law is guaranteed in the international context
only if those harmed by noncompliance possess some means of
redress against those who have broken the rules.276 Here the
269. See Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on
Financing for Development: Response Sought from International Economic
Law 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 239 (2004) (“The future of
international law depends upon the allegiance it commands from those subject
to it.”).
270. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1999) (noting that one phase of the
transnational legal process is “institutional interaction whereby global norms
of international human rights law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately
internalized by domestic legal systems.”).
271. See, e.g., Bruce Upbin, The 147 Companies That Control Everything,
FORBES, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2011/10/22/the147-companies-that-control-everything/.
272. Eric Brahm, International Law, BEYOND INRACTABILITY, available at
http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/international-law (last visited
Oct. 10, 2012) (noting that the Inter-American Court of Rights has been an
important moral voice, especially when Latin American states struggled with
political transitions).
273. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2.
276. What Is Reparation?, REDRESS, http://www.redress.org/what-isreparation/what-is-reparation (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (explaining that
reparation, an obligation of a wrongdoing party to redress the damage caused
to an injured party, is a form of redress and applies in the context of
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violation of law is considered an abuse of power.277 While the
“vertical” sovereign abuse of power has traditionally been a
central focus of rule of law conceptions, the idea of the rule of
law can be expanded to encompass other “horizontal” abuses of
power as well.278 After all, in civil matters, one party sues
another private party and the gravamen of complaint is that
the other private party, as a co-equal citizen, has broken the
law.279
This way of thinking avoids the problem of granting a
monopoly to states to handle the enforcement of law. Whereas
the idea of separation of powers has proved an effective balance
to over-concentration of sovereign power, expanding the rule of
law to other forms of governance provides new avenues for
separation of power to gain currency in the global context.280
Rule of law is an end state of affairs where law as a system
of norms is deployed in a way that justifies its existence and
authority over a community of persons.281 The rule of law is
opposed to arbitrary use of power, regardless of whether that
power is state or non-state.282 It entails that some measure of
certainty obtains in society ,whether in the short or long term.
A system of general norms enables people to foresee how they
will interact, or chose not to interact, with other citizens and
with institutions public and private.
The discussion so far reflects that rule of law is not an allinternational law).
277. See, e.g., Guantanamo Bay: An Abuse of Power and a Violation of
Human Rights, PEACES OF THE WORLD, http://peacesoftheworld.org/northamerica/guantanamo-bay-an-abuse-of-power-and-a-violation-of-human-rights/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
278. John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1
(2008).
279. See, e.g., Joe Burns, Copyright Questions and Answers, HTML
GOODIES,
http://www.htmlgoodies.com/beyond/reference/article.php
/3472671/Copyright-Questions-and-Answers.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012)
(using copyright violations as one example of when a civil lawsuit may be
brought against a defendant alleged to have broken the law).
280. Separation of Powers in a Global Context, in JUDGES, TRANSITION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE (John Morison,
Kieran McEvoy & Gordon Anthony eds. 2007).
281. John
Gardner,
Law
and
Morality,
3,
available
at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0081/pdfs/lawmoralityedited.pdf (“Law makes moral
claims, and when it makes those claims sincerely it has moral aims, and when
it succeeds in those aims it is morally justified law.”).
282. See READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 20 (Keith Culver ed.,
Broadview Press, Ltd., 1999) (maintaining that rule of law curbs forms of
arbitrary power).
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or-nothing idea.283 Moreover, emerging global governance
devices, like public-private collaboration, that blur traditional
distinctions sanctified under “hard” public international law
categorizations are not in themselves necessarily “good” or
“bad” things.284 In each case it becomes important to scrutinize
questions about whether a collaborative governance
arrangement becomes a form of “corporatocracy,”285 whether
checks and balances exist within the collaborative relationship
to restrain despotism in private and non-governmental
forms,286 whether the collaboration is a convenient shield for
deflecting responsibility or passing off blame to the another
party,287 whether NGOs (who often posture themselves as
critics of other institutions) that are parties to the syndicate
are themselves being held accountable,288 and whether a
collaborative governance scheme is a front for “crony
capitalism.”289
II. GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
A close examination of the correlation between business
283. See generally Thomas G. Weiss & Ramesh Thakur, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE AND THE UN: AN UNFINISHED JOURNEY (Ind. Univ. Press 2010).
284. Id. at 6 (saying that global governance can be “good, bad, or
indifferent”).
285. See generally Charles P. Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct
Investment
(April
1999),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/208993
6.pdf (discussing how corporations pit one government against another in
location decisions, shedding light on the idea that some governments appear to
be dominated by powerful corporations).
286. See, e.g., James Madison, FEDERALIST No. 51 (arguing that those who
make law and those who enforce it should be separated in order to provide a
check against law creators advancing their own agendas).
287. See, e.g., Nora Barrows-Friedman, Campaigners strategize refugee
return during South America visit, JEWS FOR JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS (May
6, 2012), http://jfjfp.com/?p=31467 (saying that a Palestinian “partner for
peace” allows Israel to deflect any criticism through a combination of blaming
Palestinians for not doing enough and pointing to the ongoing “peace process”
charade).
288. Mallen Baker, The accountability of NGOs, MALLENBAKER.NET (Nov.
16, 2003), http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/page.php?Story_ID=1136.
289. See Vladimir Gelman, Russia’s crony capitalism: the swing of the
pendulum, OD RUSSIA (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.opendemocracy.net/odrussia/vladimir-gelman/russia%E2%80%99s-crony-capitalism-swing-ofpendulum; see also ROY MEDVEDEV, POST-SOVIET RUSSIA (George Shriver
trans., 2000) (offering a useful historical view of the economic and political
problems in Russia since August 1991).
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and human rights in global economic governance is of vital
importance. Human rights are of precious worth because they
allow people to exercise free choice, safeguard their own
interests, and safeguard those of others.290
Human rights are at the heart of the United Nation’s
efforts.291 They occupy center stage in the creation of company
codes of conduct and constitute lodestars for civil society in
rendering their interpretations of transnational enterprises’
responsibilities.292 There is a deep connection between the rule
of law and human rights.293 Preserving and advancing human
rights is one of the most basic obligations underlying the rule of
law in both domestic and international contexts. Human rights
provide a normative foundation for democratic governments
around the world.294
Today, transnational business enterprises are drivers of
economic development at the local, regional, and global
levels.295 The decisions rendered by corporations impact the
welfare of people in numerous countries across the developing
world, often in ways that are commensurate with or even
greater than national governments.296 Indeed “there are few if
any internationally recognized human rights that business
cannot impact–or be perceived to impact–in some manner.”297

290. See TOM CAMPBELL, RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (2006)
(noting that “rights offer security through a system of social and political
entitlements” and “provide a basis for setting standards that apply to everyone
in all societies and to every government, thus holding out the prospect of
universal justice.”).
291. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., U.N. D OC.
A/HRC/20/29 (Apr. 10, 2012).
292. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/815 (April 7, 2008).
293. Gary L. McDowell & Stephen B. Presser, Foreword: Human Rights,
The Rule of Law, And National Sovereignty, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1
(2004).
294. See generally John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and
International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2009).
295. JOHN MADELEY, BIG BUSINESS, POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACT OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD’S POOR (Palgrave Macmillian,
1999).
296. See generally id.
297. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/815 (April 7, 2008).
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A. INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights discourse implicates the normative logic of
the dyad of right and wrong. The inquiry behind that discourse
aims at whether or not some value or principle is being upheld.
When a framework for human rights is engaged, as when
voluntary codes are instituted, human rights will trump
outcome-aimed considerations.298 While an assertion could be
made that human welfare will be improved by conduct violating
rights of particular people affected by such conduct, this state
of affairs cannot prevail when moral status is extended to
human rights. The non-instrumental normative logic of human
rights trumps the instrumental logic of consequentialism.
Naturally, situations arise in which human rights, values, and
principles diverge from other considerations taken to be
important to business, such as profitability, efficiency, or
sustainability objectives.
Wherever human rights obligations are at issue, although
they are often contestable in the sense that there may be no
consensus on whether some action or activity is in line with
respect for human rights, the rights themselves are not subject
to negotiations and trade-offs.
In the global context, rights discourse is sometimes
perceived as the product of a parochial western culture out of
sync with the wants and hopes of the bulk of the people on the
planet.299 In the West, a rights-oriented discourse must
confront skepticism that rights have not always advanced
progressive aims.300
As a result, a major challenge faces businesses concerning
the pursuit of human rights standards. Sometimes this concern
is veiled by the apparent eagerness with which firms inject
human rights rhetoric into their codes of conduct and annual
reports.301 Some scholars contend that, despite all of the
sanctimonious rhetoric about social responsibility and
sustainability, corporate human rights commitments are
narrowly bound by instrumental aims that effectively curb
298. See Tom Campbell, A Human Rights Approach to Developing
Voluntary Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, 16 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 255, 256 (2006) (citing RONDALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
269 (1978)).
299. TOM CAMPBELL, supra note 290, at 10.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., IBM, 2011 Corporate Responsibility Summary, available at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/2011/bin/downloads/IBM_Corp_Respon
sibility_Report_2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
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external stakeholder interests in order to fortify the power of
large business enterprises.302
On the one hand, transnational enterprises have become
accustomed to maneuvering within the various constraints
imposed by rule of law and to performing in locales where
governments hold them to human rights standards.303 To be
sure, being situated within a secure legal environment
generally improves an enterprise’s ability to successfully
conduct business.304 On the other hand, proposals to hold firms
directly accountable for human rights violations in legal
tribunals, as has been put forward by the United Nations Draft
Norms, is typically opposed by industry associations such as
the International Chamber of Commerce and the International
Organization of Employers.305 Additionally, nation-states tend
to restrict their commitments to human rights when they lend
their support to investment and trade agreements that instead
privilege respect for corporate rights.306 One noteworthy
illustration of this dynamic can be found in stabilization
agreements in which a transnational corporation and a
government stipulate that the state will not make any changes
in its laws that would elevate operating costs of the enterprise
over the duration of a projected business project.307
302. See Subhabrata B. Banerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 34 CRITICAL. SOC. 51–79 (2008).
303. Angela Walker, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort
Statute the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate Aiding and Abetting Is
Knowledge, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 119, 119 (2011).
304. See generally, Anthony D’Amato, Are Human Rights Good for
International Business? 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 22 (1979).
305. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [IOC] and Int’l Org. of Employees [IOE],
Joint Views of the IOE and ICC on the draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to
Human Rights,” (arguing that the draft norms would undermine human
rights, the business sector of society, and the right to development).
306. See Daniel Aguirre, Corporate Liability for Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights Revisited: The Failure of International Cooperation, 42 CAL.
W. INT’L. L.J. 123, 145 (2011).
307. See Andrea Shemberg, Stabilisation Clauses and Human Rights: A
Research Paper Conducted for the IFC and the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights 10
(May 27, 2009), http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf
(examining whether stabilization clauses impact a state’s ability to keep its
human rights obligations, and finding that “some stabilization clauses can be
used to limit a state’s action to implement new social and environmental
legislation to long-term investments”); Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi,
Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus
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An illustration of an instrumental justification of profit
maximization308 for the human rights responsibilities of
business is the United Nations Global Compact, which proposes
ten principles that responsible companies should observe.309
Yet, a pronounced theme throughout the Global Compact
Office’s commentary on those principles is the strategic
advantage to be obtained from enhancing corporate reputation
through observance of the principles, in the absence of any
acknowledgement of the intrinsic moral value of corporate
social responsibility.310
Adopting such a non-normative approach to the Global
Compact suggests that an instrumental profit maximization
justification is sufficient to establish the moral norms that
ought to direct corporate conduct to respect human rights. Only
by showing the instrumental value of the Compact’s principles
could one hope to convince companies to endorse the initiative
and work toward the fulfillment of its requirements.
Another illustration of instrumental justification for
human rights appears in reports of John R. Ruggie, the Special
Representative of the Secretary General of the United
Nations.311 These reports lay out the groundwork for the
Contract Interpretation, 31TEX. INT’L L.J. 215, 243 (1996) (indicating that such
clauses are designed to set up a contractual mechanism of allocating the
financial effect of political risk to the state enterprise).
308. See SONIA LABATT & RODNEY WHITE, ENVTL FIN. 301–08 (2002),
(discussing the instrumentally-based justification of profit maximization as a
central driver for socially responsible investment); United Nations
Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), Show Me the Money 4
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/show_me_the_money.pdf (noting
that the “first — and arguably for investors the most important — reason to
integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money.”); Hal Brill, Jack Brill
& Cliff Feingenbaum, INVESTING WITH YOUR VALUES: MAKING MONEY AND
MAKING A DIFFERENCE (New Society Publishers, 1999) (arguing that the area
of retail marketing provides further substantiation for the inclination to
market SRI funds with an eye toward reducing risk coupled with the objective
of generating returns that will outperform the market).
309. See
Ten
Principles,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
310. See id.
311. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John
Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights,
Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Press Release
SC/A/934 (Jul. 28, 2005) (explaining that John Ruggie was appointed by Kofi
Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, to address questions
concerning the human rights responsibilities of corporations with a view to
formulating recommendations for consideration and adoption by the UN).
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proposed UN framework to identify human rights
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises.312 One fundamental element of the
framework is the principle that corporations have a
responsibility to respect human rights in their operations
whether compelled to do so by law or its enforcement.313 The
proposed framework carries with it clear and significant
implications for public policy and the strategic management of
corporations doing business in global markets.314 It is
particularly noteworthy that in setting forth his proposals,
Ruggie nowhere appeals to or links his counsels to moral values
or any ethical frame of reference.315
Wesley Cragg puts the matter squarely as follows:
[I]n advancing his proposals, the SRSG nowhere
attempts to justify his recommendations by
suggesting or arguing that the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights is an
ethical or moral responsibility and should be
recognized as such by corporations themselves.
Neither is there any attempt in the reports
emerging from the work of the SRSG to explain
or justify this aspect of the proposed
Framework.316
Ruggie asserts that the responsibility to respect human
rights is grounded upon the social expectation associated with
“a company’s social license to operate.”317 Neglecting to live up
to such a social expectation may “subject companies to the
courts of public opinion . . . and occasionally to charges in
actual courts.”318 Failing to respect human rights could impose
risks that might impact operations, harm companies’
reputations, and, by implication, negatively affect their bottom
lines.
Ruggie characterizes his approach to enunciating the
312. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. DOC.
A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2011) [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy].
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Wesley Cragg, Ethics, Enlightened Self-Interest, and the Corporate
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Critical Look at the Justificatory
Foundations of the UN Framework, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 9, 10 (2012).
317. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312.
318. Id.
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recommended framework as “principled pragmatism.”319 He
does not specify just what this allusion to pragmatism might
mean.320 Yet, the way he justifies the advices points to an
underlying assumption that only by tying respect for human
rights to bottom line and profit maximization concerns could
business leaders in today’s world be reasonably expected to
ratify and give effect to the proposed framework.
An instrumental profit maximization justification for
business responsibility toward human rights is, from an
epistemological point of view, a moral justification grounded in
instrumental thinking. This sort of instrumental rationality is,
at the same time, premised upon a consequentialist logic that
restricts global governance’s concern for human rights and
principles such as those in the Global Compact to the
instrumental role they play in business management. On the
assumption that the purpose of shareholder-owned
corporations is to maximize profits, then, if human rights are to
exert an influence in management decision making, it must be
because they can pave the way to firms’ maximizing profits.
1. Instrumental View of CSR
The logic of the instrumental case for human rights can be
discerned to underlie an earlier and more general articulation
of an instrumental case for CSR that developed beginning in
the 1990s.321 Instrumental CSR stresses the value of corporate
responsibility as a means of furthering the financial interests of
a company.322 It is backed by the idea that responsible business
conduct makes economic sense.323 According to the so-called
“friendship” image of the relation between economics and
319. Id., ¶¶ 4-15. See also Nicola Jägers & Willem van Genugten,
Corporations and Human Rights: Moving Beyond ‘Principled Pragmatism’ to
‘Ruggie-Plus’ (March 1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844203.
320. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312.
321. See Lynn S. Paine, Does Ethics Pay? 10 BUS. ETHICS Q. 319 (2000)
(noting the launching of “ethics programs, value initiatives, and community
involvement activities” as evidence of the growing belief, during this period,
that “ethics pays”); see generally DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5 (providing an
analysis of the CSR movement and indicating that while the idea of CSR was
not novel, the current global interest in the area was unprecedented); Gond,
Palazzo & Basu, supra note 18, at 57–86.
322. See Ron Robins, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Increase
Profits?,
BUS.
ETHICS
(May
12,
2011),
http://businessethics.com/2011/05/12/does-corporate-social-responsibility-increase-profits/
(saying that most company executives believe CSR can improve profits).
323. Id.
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ethics, being ethical and attaining financial success are deemed
to go hand in hand rather than remaining at a distance as
contradictory ideals.324 The model is grounded on the premise
that a convergence can be identified between economic and
social values.325 The objective is to elucidate a plausible
economic rationale behind “doing the right thing.”326
There are two guises which the economic justification for
CSR typically assumes: the negative and the positive business
cases.327 The negative facet of the business case stresses the
destructive potential that irresponsible business practices may
unleash, causing diminution of economic value.328 It runs on
the assumption that irresponsible practices will sooner or later
be both uncovered and condemned by those stakeholder groups
of firms that are necessary for firms’ financial successes.329
Accordingly, corporate rectitude is viewed as promoting the
objectives of risk management. Corporations that do the right
thing are relieved from being obliged to pay large fines,
forfeiting revenue, or suffering reputational penalties when
malfeasance comes to light.330 Ethical conduct can also forestall
more rigid and costly regulations from being imposed.331
Moreover, building a culture of integrity and fair dealing cuts
down on coordination, transaction, and monitoring costs.332
324. See Paine, supra note 321, at 319.
325. Joe Lawless, Why Should Your Business Should [sic] Care About
Corporate Social Responsibility, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/09/business-care-about-corporate-socialresponsibility/ (“Business can be both profitable and socially responsible.”).
326. Nicole Stempak, Doing the Right Thing: The Best Risk Prevention,
BUSINESSFINANCE (June 16, 2011), http://businessfinancemag.com/article/
doing-right-thing-best-risk-prevention-0616 (“[E]thical conduct can be
ingrained into the way they do business—and that can have an impact on the
bottom line.”).
327. Paine, supra note 321, at 319; see generally JACKSON, supra note 162.
328. Paine, supra note 321, at 319 (indicating that the “negative aspect
stresses risk management and cost avoidance.”).
329. Stacy Zeiger, Effects of a Lack of Ethics on a Business Environment,
CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/effects-lack-ethics-businessenvironment-23332.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (discussing the potential
effects of irresponsible practices on small businesses).
330. The
Importance
of
Being
Ethical,
INC.,
http://www.inc.com/articles/2000/11/14278.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
331. See JACKSON, supra note 162, at 15; Paine, supra note 321, at 320.
332. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION,
BUSINESS ETHICS: A MANUAL FOR MANAGING A RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 23 (2004) (“By providing
employees clear guidelines on how to conduct day-to-day business in
compliance with laws and ethics through a business ethics program, the RBE
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Instead, it promotes cooperation, eases conflict, and fosters
processes of contracting.333
By contrast, the positive side of the business case stresses
CSR’s ability to contribute benefits.334 Thus, ethical business
conduct thwarts reputational costs and produces tangible
reputational benefits.335 A reputation based on responsibility,
reliability, and trust may help firms attract and retain talent in
the employment market, generate repeat business, reduce the
cost of capital, solidify customer loyalty, magnify advertising
impact, strengthen bargaining power, and boost investor
confidence.336 Finally, a corporate culture of integrity often
stimulates enhanced productivity and unleashes creativity and
innovation within firms’ workforces.337
Research on the business case for corporate responsibility
divides into two streams: empirical and normative.338 Empirical
research purporting to buttress the business case strives to
prove positive correlations between responsible business
conduct and financial success.339 One meta study set out to
demonstrate statistical linkages between corporate social
performance
and
corporate
financial
performance.340
Incorporating data across various industries and study
contexts, the study concluded that “corporate virtue in the form
of social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, environmental
responsibility is likely to pay off.”341
This is not to say that empirical research establishing
positive connections between corporate responsibility and
[responsible business enterprise] can reduce transaction costs.”).
333. See Paine, supra note 321, at 320.
334. See generally Jackson, supra note 162; LRN, Ethics and Compliance
Risk Management: Improving Business Performance and Fostering a Strong
Ethical Culture Through a Sustainable Process, at 2, available at
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNRiskManagement.pdf.
335. LRN, Ethics and Compliance Risk Management: Improving Business
Performance and Fostering a Strong Ethical Culture Through a Sustainable
Process,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNRiskManagement.pdf.
336. See JACKSON, supra note 162, at 12–15.
337. Id. at 129.
338. See Marc T. Jones, Disrobing the Emperor: Mainstream CSR Research
and
Corporate
Hegemony
(Aug.
2008),
available
at
http://www.crrconference.org/downloads/jones.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
339. Robert C. McMurrian & Erika Matulich, Building Customer Value
and Profitability with Business Ethics, 4 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 11 (2006).
340. Mark Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, & Sara L. Rynes, Corporate Social
and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003).
341. Id.
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financial performance is free from attack by skeptics. Some
skeptics are quick to highlight difficulties associated with the
operationalization of social and financial performance, which
may call for a qualification of findings.342 Further studies raise
critical concerns over measurement limitations inherent in
attempts to gain quantitative confirmation relative to
corporations’ pursuits of socially responsibility behaviors.343
In light of such questions, Lynn S. Paine offers this
assessment of the status of the business case:
While ethics and economics are mutually
supportive in many respects, the economic case
for corporate ethics goes only so far. It is wishful
thinking to suppose otherwise. Even when cast
in general tendencies rather than axiomatic
truths, the case leaves wide berth for divergence
between what is good and what is profitable.344
Even empirical studies supporting the business case may
be predicated upon their own normative assumptions.345 In the
eyes of David Vogel, the supposedly empirical assertion that
some companies attain financial reward as a consequence of
their responsible conduct lends little comfort to proponents of
CSR:“The reason they have placed so much importance on
‘proving’ that CSR pays, is because they want to demonstrate,
first, that behaving more responsibly is in the self-interest of
all firms, and second, that CSR always makes business
sense.”346
Thus, in Vogel’s estimation, advocates of CSR set out to
tout economic success as the raison d’etre for business
enterprises to commit themselves to a path of corporate social
responsibility.347 Yet, taking such a normative angle in order to
prop up the instrumentalist rationale for CSR meets with some
disapproval from the standpoint of moral philosophy.348 Paine
342. Id. at 403 (citing, among other studies, Wood and Jones’s finding that
clear causal patterns in this area have been elusive).
343. See Sandra A. Waddock & Samual B. Graves, The Corporate Social
Performance-Financial Performance Link, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 304
(1997) (noting that CSP is difficult to measure because it “is a multidimensional construct with behaviors ranging across a wide variety of
inputs.”). See generally DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5, at 29–33.
344. Paine, supra note 321, at 324–25.
345. DAVID VOGEL, supra note 5.
346. Id. at 34.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Paine, supra note 321.
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questions the underlying logic of instrumentalist justification
by framing the terms of debate as follows: assuming that
businesses operate responsibly based purely on the
instrumentalist explanation that ethics is profitable, what
would logically follow if it turns out that ethics does not pay
after all?349 The crux of the matter may be stated as follows:
The intellectual currents propelling the “ethics
pays” argument conceal a dangerous undertow.
On the surface, ethics appears to be gaining
importance as a basis for reasoning and
justification. At a deeper level, however, it is
being undermined. For implicit in the appeal to
economics as a justification for ethics is
acceptance of economics as the more
authoritative rationale. Rather than being a
domain of rationality capable of challenging
economics, ethics is conceived only as a tool of
economics.350
2. Instrumental Reasoning within the Human Rights
Milieu
The business case mode of justification has been
transferred from the CSR discourse into the human rights
domain. The UN Framework which now serves as the focal
point in the business and human rights debate is emblematic of
this trend.351
Indeed, the heightened public sensitivity toward corporate
misdeeds combined with readily available and shared
information have raised the stakes for corporations to engage
in irresponsible activity. This may be particularly so with
regard to “moral felonies,” occurrences of severe malfeasance
connected with basic human rights.352
The long-term reputational ramifications of a company
being associated with acute human rights violations can be
substantial and protracted. For example, Shell continues to pay
the price for complying with the Nigerian government in its
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other opponents of the
349. See id. at 327.
350. See id. at 327.
351. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312.
352. See JACKSON supra note 162, at 151, 166-67 (noting that corporations
are held to high moral standards, and providing a guide for evaluating good
and bad behavior).
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Nigerian government’s military régime.353
Companies heavily invested in their brands are mindful of
such hazards. For example, Apple’s advocacy for better work
conditions at its Chinese subcontractor’s plants is illustrative.
Following mounting public backlash from highly publicized
reports of employee suicides and dismal working conditions at
the workshops of its supplier, Foxconn, Apple joined the Fair
Labor Association.354 Apple asked the Fair Labor Association to
investigate Foxconn’s factories engaged in manufacturing
Apple merchandise.355 As a result of the investigation, Foxconn
pledged to pursue demonstrable goals concerning improved pay
and work conditions at its facilities.356 The concord is widely
regarded as having contributed to a positive and enduring
makeover of the manufacturing scene in China.357
A centering of discourse regarding the appropriateness and
limitations of instrumental logic in the field of business and
human rights is called for in the current academic climate
wherein views are moving away from the traditional
assumption that, from both a legal and political perspective,
the protection of human rights is an exclusive concern of
governments.358 Corporations are no longer considered immune
from shouldering direct human rights obligations, save what
was prescribed by law.359 Indeed, not only was human rights
discourse largely absent from ascriptions of CSR, the field of
CSR was itself traditionally conceived of as being mainly
addressed to voluntary business behavior.360 In other words,
353. CHRISTOPHER L. AVERY, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF
CHANGE 7 (2000).
354. Apple Joins Fair Labor Association, PRNEWSWIRE (Jan. 13, 2012).
355. Don Reisinger, Apple Launches Fair Labor Inspections of Foxconn,
CNET (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:44 AM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_357376431-17/apple-launches-fair-labor-inspections-of-foxconn/.
356. See JACKSON supra note 162, at 151, 166-67 (noting that corporations
are held to high moral standards, and providing a guide for evaluating good
and bad behavior).
357. Charles Duhigg & Steven Greenhouse, Electronic Giant Vowing
Reforms in China Plants, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2012, at A1.
358. See, e.g., Promoting Peace & Protecting Human Rights: Business
Operations in Conflict Zones, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR ECONOMICS AND CONFLICTS (Jan. 8, 2012),
http://inec.usip.org/blog/2012/jan/08/promoting-peace-protecting-humanrights-business-operations-conflict-zones (“[C]ompanies can proactively build
peace and protect human rights . . . .”).
359. See id.
360. Comm’n of the European Comtys., Implementing the Partnership for
Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on Corporate Social
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CSR was thought of as being the responsibility that companies
assume on voluntary bases beyond mere legal compliance.361 By
contrast, human rights comprise the most elemental moral
entitlements of human beings,362 and are therefore correlative
to equally fundamental moral obligations. Such a fundamental
moral imperative attached to human rights is discordant with
the sort of discretionary approach to responsibility that has
been characteristic of conventional accounts of CSR.363 It is
only recently that CSR discourse has transitioned beyond a
voluntaristic paradigm.364 Consequently, human rights are
coming to occupy a more pronounced position in CSR.365
The apparent normative disconnect between an
understanding of human rights as basic moral imperatives and
an alternative understanding of CSR as a voluntary and
discretionary undertaking has accentuated the allure of
instrumental justifications for corporate responsibility toward
human rights. A substitution of the non-instrumentally
grounded vocabulary of moral obligation with that of the
instrumentally-based language of economic incentives has
tended to perpetuate corporate approaches to human rights
questions without abandoning the presumptions of
voluntariness. The dominant assumption has been that
companies neglecting to undertake human rights commitments
voluntarily will do so to their own financial peril.366
Despite the prevalent use of instrumental logic to frame
Responsibility, March 22, 2006, at 2.
361. Florian Wettstein & Sandra Waddock, Voluntary or Mandatory: That
Is (Not) the Question, 6:3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-UND
UNTERNEHMENSETHIK 304, 304 (2005) (referencing the “traditional” view of
CSR as a voluntary affair for businesses).
362. John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, UNESCO
POVERTY PROJECT PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR (March 2003), available at
http://www.c3mundos.org/files/Tasioulas%20%282004%29%20The%20Moral%
20Reality%20of%20Human%20Rights.pdf.
363. See generally Wettsetin & Waddock, supra note 361.
364. See European Comm’n, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate
Social Responsibility, October 25, 2011, at 4 (noting that the change in
strategy resulted from public distrust of corporate entities following the
economic crisis).
365. See generally Geoffrey Chandler, The Evolution of the Business and
Human Rights Debate, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND
SOLUTIONS 22–32 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003); Geoffrey Chandler Keynote
Address: Crafting a Human Rights Agenda for Business in HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 39–
45 (M. K. Addo ed., 1999).
366. See Higginbotham, supra note 192.
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voluntaristic and discretionary explanations for corporate
human rights responsibility, it is especially within the context
of human rights that the defects of instrumental justifications
for CSR can be clearly discerned.
3. Cracks in Foundations of Negative Business Case for
Human Rights
A negative business case for business responsibility to
respect human rights emphasizes the anticipated negative
public repercussions from corporate contraventions of human
rights and, accordingly, the reputational damage and adverse
bearing on a firm’s social license to function that result from it.
The reasoning behind the negative business case argument
is predicated upon the idea of moral blame.367 If customers did
not assign any blame to organizations for malfeasance, no
reason would exist for customers to discontinue patronizing
organizations’ products or services. Absent any ascription of
culpability, firms would not be in positions to sustain any
reputational harm. Absent any imputation of moral wrongdoing
by investors, they would have no motive to cease investing in it.
The various costs and risks flowing from irresponsible business
conduct only come about for companies when companies are
deemed blameworthy for something. The logic underpinning
the negative business case for responsibility to respect human
rights assumes the presence of some moral blame, which is
enunciated and disseminated informally by way of the “court of
public opinion” in the global context.368
Blame is ordinarily accompanied by moral indignation.
Society typically impugns moral actors, whether people or
organizations, if it thinks that their acts or omissions can be
properly categorized as unethical and if it believes their
offenses toward moral actors’ conduct are warranted.369 Moral
blame involves treating the moral agent targeted for blame as
having a reason to act ethically but yet failing to do so.370
367. The business of business is responsible business, UNIVERSITY OF
STELLENBOSCH
BUSINESS
SCHOOL
(Dec.
1,
2011),
http://www.usb.ac.za/NewsAndEvents/FullNewsItem.aspx?NewsItem=3801&
RefFunctionality=inthenews (noting that responsibility is often associated
with apportioning blame).
368. See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra 312.
369. See Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543–571 (1983)
(discussing how people assess the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor).
370. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995).
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Society assigns blame to moral agents when it thinks that they
should have acted differently.371 In this way, blameworthiness
presupposes
logically
prior
and
non-instrumental
responsibility. That is because society does not lay blame for
conduct that is simply discretionary.372 In other words, laying
blame amounts to a characteristic response within an ethical
system for an actor’s failure to satisfy some moral obligation.373
In terms of logical inference then, it is a moral justification
rather an economic one that carries the day for prescription of
business conduct.374 Correspondingly, businesses shoulder
duties to respect human rights not due to anticipated
reputational risks of non-compliance or to any projected cost
savings, but instead because they carry a moral obligation to do
so. Therefore, to proffer an instrumentally-oriented business
case for such an obligation is, normatively speaking, beside the
point. The ground of moral obligations is non-instrumental.
Such obligations ought to be satisfied independently of any
calculations of financial returns. In other words, even if the
business case argument were to somehow collapse, the
obligations would still need to be followed. In the final analysis,
the business case argument gets swallowed up by the very
moral presuppositions upon which it stands.375
Arguably, this is the situation regarding human rights. As
Kant, John Stuart Mill and Onora O’Neill contend, obligations
that correlate to rights amount to perfect obligations.376 Perfect
obligations are determinate in reference to both their
addressees and to their duty-holders.377 They specify exactly
what is owed.378 As situated within the sphere of justice, as
371. Id.
372. See id. at 177.
373. Id.
374. See PETER ULRICH, INTEGRATIVE ECONOMIC ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS OF
A CIVILIZED MARKET ECONOMY 106 (2008) (noting that the safeguarding of
moral rights is more important than the safeguarding of economic agents’
private interests in the employment of their resources in a way that is most
efficient for them).
375. See Andrew C. Khourny, Blameworthiness and Wrongness, 45 VALUE
INQUIRY 135–146 (2011) (urging the rejection of the assumption that
blameworthiness presupposes wrongfulness).
376. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 77 (M. Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); MILL, supra note 215, at 47; ONORA O’NEILL,
TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 128–41 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
377. O’Neill, supra note 376, at 129–30, 147.
378. Id.
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opposed to the realm of utility, perfect obligations can be
demanded by correlative rights-holders and are consequently
morally owed by the respective duty-bearers.379 Therefore,
carrying these kinds of obligations is something that arises
independently of any anticipated economic payoff that might
ensue from satisfying these obligations.
A critic might allege that the negative business case for
human rights responsibility need not assume that any deeper
moral obligations exist. Instead, it only needs to take into
account the perception of such obligations for business. Here
the source of blame rests upon descriptive social expectations
held concerning the human rights conduct of business.
“[B]roader scope of the responsibility to respect is defined by
social expectations—as part of what is sometimes called a
company’s social license to operate.”380
However, even if blame is pegged upon social expectations
instead of moral obligation, ultimately instrumental business
case arguments seek to shore up a case for human rights
responsibility. Doing so means equating responsibility as a
moral category with social expectations. The normative logic
underlying this argument is that the human rights
responsibilities of business are defined by and justified with
reference to social expectations. Not meeting these
expectations, then, is a failure to meet a moral responsibility
and, from this perspective, is the source for justified moral
blame.381 Blame presupposes at least the assumption by the
originator that blame is warranted.382 Thus, any argument that
instrumentalizes blame as a normative force for regulating
behavior logically assumes that some justification for blame
exists in the first place.383
Thus, the problem is not so much that the business case
argument bypasses morality but that it leans on a conventional

379. Id. at 128.
380. Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 312, ¶ 54.
381. See Smith, supra note 369, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995).
382. See Smith, supra note 381, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995).
383. See Smith, supra note 381, at 543–571 (discussing how people assess
the culpability or blameworthiness of an actor); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 42 (1995).
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or positivist conception of morality.384 While social expectations
may serve as general guides for moral conduct and may provide
rough indications of morality, they do not on their own
constitute reliable justificatory bases for morality.385 The
widespread acceptance of the institution of slavery in the
antebellum United States illustrates how social expectations
are not necessarily congruent with, and indeed can sharply
diverge from, human rights standards.386 Generally, the
descriptive logic of social expectations (“is”) is an insufficient
basis from which to derive normative prescriptions of ethics
(“ought”).387 To do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.388
Instead, the legitimacy of social expectations must be secured
on the basis of normative logic itself, and is thereby still subject
to further ethical scrutiny. In summary, the reason for the
criticism of instrumental business case reasoning is that its
logical foundation is formed from a faulty understanding of
morally justified responsibility.
Alternatively, a critic might allege that society can
conveniently eliminate all references to moral responsibility
from the business case scenario such that respecting human
rights are reduced to a “business consideration” assessed
384. See Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political
Conception of Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a
Habermasian Perspective, 32(4) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1096, 1099 (2007)
(critiquing positivist portrayals of corporate responsibility).
385. See generally O’Neill, supra note 375, at 187 (describing how virtues
like justice and fairness may be imbedded in social traditions and culture, and
how they may alternatively be perverted by cultures of corruption).
386. Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and
Practices Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253,
entered into force Mar. 9, 1927.
387. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATIRE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., 2nd ed. 1978) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met
with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary
that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”).
388. See generally G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1959) (describing the “naturalistic fallacy” as the tendency of
philosophers to think that when they name other properties they were
actually defining good that those properties, in fact, were simply not “other”
but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness).
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entirely by its bottom line impact.389 However, if respecting
human rights is a non-moral choice made on a functionalist
basis and dictated solely by financial payoff, then the logic of
such a variety of business cases turns out to be circular,
tantamount to constructing a business case for selling goods
and services, that is, for doing business itself.
4. Assessment of Positive Business Case for Human
Rights
The positive business case emphasizes the reputational
advantages, stepped-up sales, or enhanced productivity
resulting from corporations pursuing responsible conduct.
Considered within the context of global economic
governance and human rights, this argument is suspect.
Whereas the negative business case revolves around assigning
blame, the positive business case revolves around granting
acclaim.390 In the same way that blameworthiness assumes
some prior violation of moral duty, praiseworthiness assumes
some prior achievement beyond moral duty.391 Normally,
society does not extend commendation to people or companies
merely for satisfying their obligations,392 unless there was little
trust for those people or companies in the first place. This
suggests that, from a moral point of view, tribute rests within
the realms of the supererogatory and what is ethically
discretionary.393
Framing a positive business case for human rights would
imply that for corporations to respect human rights is above
and beyond the call of duty. However, this assertion rests on
the assumption that there is no fundamental moral obligation

389. But see James Fieser, Do Businesses Have Moral Obligations Beyond
What the Law Requires?, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 457 (1996) (criticizing the view
that morality in business can be derived from the profit motivation).
390. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (providing an example of
praiseworthy action by describing how “saints and heroes are admired because
they fulfill quite ordinary ethical requirements, but do so with superabundance”).
391. See generally id.
392. See id. (“It is hard to see how institutions could achieve
superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and going beyond
justice is not more just.”).
393. Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real Challenge of
Corporate Global Citizenship, 105(1) BUS. AND SOC’Y REVIEW 47, 47–62 (“Too
much of the time, when we think about . . . corporate responsibility, we think
about it as a discretionary responsibility.”).
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for businesses to do so.394 Implicitly, the positive business case
situates respect for human rights within the realm of
supererogation rather than within the realm of what is morally
owed.395 In other words, it presupposes that respecting human
rights is discretionary rather than obligatory.396
Taking that stance on the responsibility to respect
contradicts the nature of human rights as basic moral
entitlements of human beings. Human rights protect the most
fundamental freedoms that define autonomy of intentional,
moral persons.397 Human rights are possessed by humans
simply by virtue of being human.398 Understood as moral
entitlements, human rights are commonly acknowledged as
universal and equal rights.399 In other words, all humans ought
to enjoy them regardless of who those humans are, where those
humans come from, or what those humans believe. Human
rights define and protect the fundamental equality of all
human beings in terms of moral worth and their dignity as
moral persons.400 However, respect for people’s dignity and
thus for their most basic human rights is owed to all people
unconditionally.401 Respect for human rights is a matter of
justice rather than one of beneficence.402
Simply meeting the most fundamental obligations of
justice warrants no praise. Rather, the fulfillment of such
394. See O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (“It is hard to see how institutions
could achieve superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and
going beyond justice is not more just.”).
395. Id. at 206 (supererogatory conduct is “action that exceeds the demands
of duty, yet is ethically admirable”); Kant, supra note 376, at 42, 52
(supererogation permits some latitude for free choice).
396. See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Distributive Justice and the Corporate
Duty to Aid, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 547 (1993) (arguing that even a multinational
corporation’s obligation to provide assistance to those deprived of basic rights,
understood by some scholars to fall within the domain of the supererogatory,
can be properly interpreted as a prima facie moral obligation of international
justice).
397. See generally Tom Campbell, Moral Dimensions of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 12 (Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller eds.,
2004) (describing the nature and function of human rights).
398. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1 (Cornell Univ. Press 2003); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2
(Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
399. Campbell, supra note 397.
400. Griffin, supra note 398, at 31–33.
401. Id. at 31–33.
402. Mill, supra note 376, at 59.
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obligations is a basic expectation addressed broadly to all
participants in the global governance arena, and applies a
fortiori to business enterprises because of their extensive
power, influence, and economic resources.403 Arguing for a
positive business case for the responsibility to respect human
rights confuses categories of normative logic and signals a
potential threat to the very concept of human rights. Implying
that respecting human rights is a praiseworthy endeavor
obscures the fundamental nature of human rights as ethical
imperatives and relegates them to the province of benevolence
or moral discretion.404
5. Responsibilities of Collaborative Governance Régimes
for Human Rights
Correlative to any basic right are three kinds of duties: the
duty to avoid depriving, the duty to protect from deprivation,
and the duty to aid the deprived.405 Alternatively stated in a
way that is concordant with the language of contemporary
global governance initiatives, this triad of obligations could be
referred to as the duty to respect human rights, the duty to
protect human rights, and the duty to realize human rights
where they have been violated or never been fulfilled. For a
right to be fully respected, all three of these duties must be
satisfied.406 Therefore, the question naturally arises as to just
whose duty it is to respect, protect, and realize basic rights.
Of the three types of duty, the duty to respect human
rights appears to be the least controversial. Because it
prescribes a universal duty, all moral actors are equally
obligated by it.407 In other words, the duty not to violate human
rights holds for all equally, in the same degree, and it holds for
all times. However, it is harder to reckon with the other two
kinds of duties. Both require some positive action and are
accordingly particular rather than universal. They obligate
some, but not all, moral actors at varying degrees and times.
This means that respecting rights entails some division of
403. See O’Neill, supra note 376, at 209 (“It is hard to see how institutions
could achieve superabundant justice: justice is a matter of what is due, and
going beyond justice is not more just.”).
404. Id. at 206.
405. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 52 (Princeton Univ. Press 1996).
406. Id. at 53.
407. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 101 (implying that human
rights impose universal duties by referring to them as “doubly universal”).
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moral labor.408 It necessitates a fusion of different actors and
institutions joining forces to add their respective contributions
to the governance mix. In the global economic governance
context, this means that determinations need to be made about
how
obligations
differ
between
nation-states,
intergovernmental organizations, business enterprises, NGOs,
and other elements of civil society.409 Each element of civil
society is unable to accomplish it alone, but elements can pool
their capabilities within targeted collaborative undertakings.
The ideal of satisfying human rights in all their normative
features remains a challenging collective undertaking for
economic participants.
In the context of global economic governance, particularly
in light of the variant forms of collaborative governance
discussed in section one of this article, corporate responsibility
stands in need of being re-imagined as global collaborative
responsibility.410 An interpretation of global collaborative
responsibility looks beyond effects of the solitary activities of
economic participants and considers the peculiar power and
influence that can be achieved from collaboration with fellow
actors and institutions as a criterion of international legal and
moral responsibility.411 In this connection, Kenneth Goodpaster
contends that “even if a company does not have a categorical
responsibility, a responsibility to resolve the moral challenge on
its own, it can still have a qualified responsibility to make an
effort—or to participate in the efforts of others in seeking a
collaborative resolution.”412 He posits that “[t]he significance of
a given threat to human dignity or justice in the community
408. Shue, supra note 405.
409. See THOMAS DONALSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
73–75 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (setting out a scheme for dividing
responsibilities between governments, corporations, and private individuals).
410. David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An
Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 7 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds.,
Polity Press 2000) (globalization poses a challenge for “territorial principle of
modern social and political organization”). See also, Virginia Held, Can a
Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible? 67 J. PHIL. 471
(1970) (arguing that under some conditions even a random assembly of moral
agents can be held responsible for failure to act as a group).
411. See generally Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Corporate Responsibility and Its
Constituents, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS ETHICS 126, 126–27
(George G. Brenkert & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010)
(describing three distinct levels of responsibility: individual, corporate, and
societal).
412. Id. at 147.
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might raise our reasonable expectations of a corporation’s
responsibility, even if we acknowledge that, in the end, we are
dealing with a qualified responsibility.”413
A variety of views treat both the foundations of qualified
positive responsibility and the outer boundaries of qualified
positive responsibility. Scholars hailing from disciplines of
law,414 moral and political philosophy,415 and business ethics 416
approach the question from the standpoints of social
connection,417 Rawlsian duty of aid,418 corporate duty of
assistance,419 or the margins of property rights.420 A common
contention is that fair apportionment of responsibility421 rises
in proportion to an agent’s abilities,422 capacities,423 power,424
413. Id.
414. See David Bilchitz, Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental
Rights Obligations? 57 THEORIA 1 (2010); Justine Nolan & Luke Taylor
Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in
Search of a Remedy? 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 433 (2009); Stephan Wood, The Case
for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights Responsibility, 22 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 63 (2012).
415. See Michael Green, Institutional Responsibility for Moral Problems, in
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 117 (A.
Kuper ed., Routledge 2005); David Miller, Distributing Responsibilities, in
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES: WHO MUST DELIVER ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 95 (A.
Kuper ed., Routledge 2005).
416. MICHAEL SANTORO, PROFITS AND PRINCIPLES: GLOBAL CAPITALISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Cornell Univ. Press 2000); MICHAEL SANTORO,
CHINA 2020: HOW WESTERN BUSINESS CAN – AND SHOULD – INFLUENCE
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE COMING DECADE (Cornell Univ. Press
2009); Nien-hê Hsieh, The Obligations of Transnational Corporations:
Rawlsian Justice and the Duty of Assistance, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 643 (2004).
417. See Iris Young, From Guilt to Solidarity: Sweatshops and Political
Responsibility, 50 DISSENT 39 (2003); Iris Young, Responsibility and Global
Labor Justice, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 365 (2004); Iris Young, Responsibility and
Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102 (2006).
418. See Hsieh, supra note 416, at 643.
419. See Wood, supra note 414.
420. See Bilchitz, supra note 414.
421. See Santoro, Profits and Principles, supra note 416, at 154–55
(“[H]uman rights duties should be allocated according to three factors:
relationship effectiveness, and capacity… When these three factors are taken
into account, the duties that can be fairly allocated to come actors… are not
only different from those assigned to other actors … but they may also be, as a
practical matter, more onerous as well.”); Santoro, China 2020, supra note
416, at 17 (describing the “fair share” theory of corporate human rights
responsibilities).
422. Florian Wettstein, Beyond Voluntariness, Beyond CSR: Making a Case
for Human Rights and Justice 114 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 125 (2009).
423. Miller, supra note 415; Tom Campbell, supra note 298.
424. See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF
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clout,425 or potential for effectuating positive influence.426
In his writing of the recent Guiding Principles, Ruggie
modified his former position opposing non-causal human rights
responsibility.427
His
modified
position
states:“The
responsibility to respect human rights requires that business
enterprises . . . Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations,
products or services by their business relationships, even if they
have not contributed to those impacts.”428
Consequently, if corporate human rights responsibility is
interpreted to advance farther than just the negative sphere of
respecting human rights and to encompass positive features
founded on power or influence, then a need arises to address
the potential of a business case for corporations’ proactive
engagement for the protection and realization of human rights.
According to instrumentalist reasoning, corporations that
passively respect and actively engage in the protection and
realization of human rights might be positioned to earn
goodwill from the public and customer bases, which could
translate into economic benefits.429
However, the question is what counts as “above and
beyond” when it comes to corporations’ responsibilities in the
protection and realization of human rights? If corporations
have qualified positive human rights obligations and their
obligations therefore extend beyond the negative realm of doing
no harm, then the instrumental argument regarding those
circumstances fails on the same conceptual grounds as was
ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 92–93 (Univ. Chicago Press 1984);
Stephen Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility:
Transnational Politics, Transnational Firms and Human Rights, 19 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 349, 350 (2009); Young, From Guilt to Solidarity. Sweatshops and
Political Responsibility, supra note 417, at 43; Young, Responsibility and
Global Labor Justice, supra note 417, at 381.
425. Wood, supra note 414.
426. See generally Santoro, supra note 416, at 143 (“If a corporation cannot
make a positive impact by performing an action, then it makes little sense to
say that it is morally required to do so.”).
427. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21,
2011).
428. Id., ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
429. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 50 n.25 (describing
instrumental reasoning “such as the claim that those who seek some end
must, if rational, seek or take what they believe to be a means that contributes
to that end.”).
AN
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outlined in the preceding sections.
Advancing an instrumental argument for human rights
responsibilities of corporations is per se problematic. A more
plausible option, therefore, is to base such responsibilities on
non-instrumental moral grounds.430 This, however, implies an
extension of corporate responsibility beyond the mere respect of
human rights. As such, a non-instrumental moral alternative
to the instrumental business case argument fundamentally
challenges the UN Framework’s rigid division of responsibility
between corporation and state.
B. NON-INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS
Standing alongside the notion of the rule of law as a noninstrumental regulative ideal is the concept of human rights
justifiable on non-instrumental moral grounds.
1. Common Public Justification
In the context of collaborative governance régimes, there
are various ways in which human rights figure into decisionmaking. Two common forms of such justification are
contractualist431 and functionalist432 approaches. The
differences in approaches to human rights stem from
alternative forms of justification. Such differences in justifying
theories, in turn, significantly influencethe way that human
rights are applied in specific situations where they compete
with other standards.
430. See, e.g., Dennis Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to
Respect Basic Human Rights, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 371 (2010); Cragg, supra note
316.
431. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 78-79 (describing the narrow
contractuarian justification as geared toward satisfying human rights
specifically within frameworks shaped to meet the expectations of participants
agreeing to a mutual exchange of commitments; criticizing the contractuarian
justification’s inconsistency and fragmentation).
432. L. Amede Obiora, Reconstituted Consonants: The Reach of a “Common
Core” Analogy in Human Rights, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 921, 945
(1998). A functionalist justification takes the particular purpose of an
organization to establish the parameters of its moral responsibility vis à vis
human rights. Whereas common public justification is expansive, functionalist
justification is more narrowly circumscribed. An actor is seen to be responsible
across a narrower spectrum of people, and with regard to each person it is
responsible for a narrower slice of interests. As
applied
to
for-profit
corporations, a functionalist justificatory frame of reference endorses the
traditional shareholder conception, whereby a firm’s interests are narrowly
focused on the interests of its shareholders.
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The form of justification of human rights most closely
associated with the conception of rule of law that was
elaborated in section one of this article is what may be termed
common public justification.433 Compared to other forms of
justification, this approach extends the widest scope and
assigns the most substantial prima facie weighting to human
rights. Human rights are taken to guide and constrain from
abuses of power all varieties of actors that comprise civil
society:
governments,
intergovernmental
organizations,
business enterprises, NGOs, private associations, and
individuals. Their responsibility holds wherever they are
situated, and attaches to local, national, and international
levels of activity across all sectors.
Within the frame of reference of a common public
justification, responsibility extends to anyone that may be
affected by actors’ conduct. The actor is responsible for taking
into account all of the rights of those affected. This means, for
example, that a company is responsible not just for respecting
the human rights of its shareholders and employees, but also
for respecting the human rights of its consumers, suppliers,
and other stakeholders. Likewise, an intergovernmental
organization is under the conception of public common
justification, responsible not just for respecting the rights of
manufacturers of member states that stand to gain when it
fulfills its mandate in promoting global trade, but also for
respecting other human rights of people impacted by goods and
services in markets opened by those trade agreements.
It is necessary to take into account the challenging
interpretive matter of determining the proper scope of and also
of balancing and weighting such rights when they conflict with
each other and with other considerations.434
2. Human Rights as Higher Law
It has been known from antiquity that there exists a law
higher than written human decrees.435
433. Meintjes, supra note 28, at 83.
434. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Univ. of Cal.
Press 1987).
435. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, lines 453–57; WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, GREAT
POLITICAL THINKERS: FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT 133 (Harcourt College
Publishers 2000) (quoting Marcus Tullius Cicero in the Republic: “There will
not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and
all times.”).
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The idea of an unseen higher law remains at the
foundation of the modern concept of rights. John Locke
maintained that even in a state of nature, there is a law
recognized by all people which is implanted in human
reason.436 Such a law of nature engenders natural rights
discernible by all rational beings.437 Such a conception
designates rights that are taken to be independent of and prior
to rights established by particular political arrangements.
In the realm of international law, the notion of an
unwritten higher law has been vital. For instance, during the
Nazi war crimes trials at Nuremberg, jurisdictional limitations
precluded prosecuting the crimes pursuant to the laws of the
various participating nation-states.438 Accordingly, the
indictments referenced “crimes against humanity.”439
Recourse to the idea of a higher moral law has been central
to many civil rights cases throughout American history. Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s famous “Letter from Birmingham Jail”
decried the persistence of racial prejudice from extant law:
A just law is a man-made code that squares with
the moral law, or the law of God. An unjust law
is a code that is out of harmony with the moral
law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas
Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is
not rooted in eternal law and natural law.440
For Aquinas, natural law is that part of the eternal law of
the Creator that is presented to human reason.441 Society is
guided by a rational apprehension of the eternal law which is
436. See generally O’Neill, supra note 376, at 140 (“Locke …[began] not
with rights but with Natural Law or duty, and discuss[ed] justice and virtue in
tandem.”).
437. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).
438. See generally Philippe Kirsch, Applying the Principles of Nuremburg
in the International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 501, 504
(2007) (stating that the Nuremburg courts only had jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the peace).
439. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME
OF CRIMES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
440. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” (Apr. 16,
1963); THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II Q. 95, art. 2 (“[E]very
human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law
of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a
law but a perversion of law.”).
441. Griffin, supra note 398, at 9.
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imprinted as precepts, rules of behavior, or broad principles of
natural law.442 Because humans are autonomous beings, they
must choose to observe the law of nature through their own
acts of free will.443 Natural law is a product of unaided
reason.444 Human laws are positive laws that are, or should be,
derived from natural law.445 It is the correlation between
higher unwritten law and written norms, such as those
constituting public international law and human rights, that
establishes the moral legitimacy of those written norms.446
The normative principles of human rights connected to
fundamental aspects of human well-being guide practical
reason.447 They also inform moral deliberation about how
people, governments, business enterprises, and other
organizations should act.448 Logically speaking, such
foundational principles of practical reflection entail norms that
lead elements of society to pursue some options, while requiring
that others be abandoned.449 Drawing upon a conception of a
higher moral law provides a means of calling attention to
objective principles of right action for business.
Both the concept of human rights and the notion of the rule
of law are ultimately moral ideas. Despite the inclinations of
some people toward ethical relativism, these ideas are
grounded in objective morality. They both insist that there are
limits on the ways in which governments, business enterprises,
and individuals can pursue their chosen objectives.
442. Id.
443. EDWARD W. YOUNKINS, CHAMPIONS OF A FREE SOCIETY: IDEAS OF
CAPITALISM’S PHILOSOPHERS AND ECONOMISISTS 72 (Lexington Books 2008)
(“Because men are autonomous beings they must choose to observe the law of
nature through acts of free will.”).
444. Id.
445. Aquinas, supra note 440 (“Now both these conditions are verified of
human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or
measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is
twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law.”).
446. See, e.g., David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation
in the British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 931
(2003).
447. For a general discussion of the normative and theoretical foundations
of human rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICS AND PRACTICE 11–25 (Michael
Goodhart ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
448. See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
supra note 427, para. 14.
449. O’Neill, supra note 376, at 36 (“Actual norms and traditions … can
indeed guide action.”).
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Some would argue that using human rights language to
account for broad moral principles of corporate governance is
unnecessary.450 While it may not be absolutely necessary to
employ the vocabulary of rights, it seems reasonable and
efficacious to do so. One properly speaks of an employee’s right
to not be discriminated against by her company on the basis of
her gender.451 One can accurately describe a garment
subcontractor’s trafficking in human slavery as a violation of
human rights.452 All individuals, from whatever communities
they are drawn, are bound to respect these human rights
because of their virtue for humanity rather than because of the
individuals’ membership in a particular domestic or
international legal order.453
As Aristotle and other thinkers have endeavored to show,
the nature of human beings is rational.454 It is with regard to
distinctive human nature that people are endowed with a
profound, robust, and inherent moral agency, equality, and
dignity. Each of these ideas is considered below.
3. Agency
As rational agents, human beings are uniquely equipped to
make choices and decisions that are illuminated by moral
deliberation.455 Because of this, human beings are rightly held
accountable for their choices and conduct.456
Exercising moral agency mandates that human beings
have freedom to make choices consistent with values of their
free choice.457 In other words, moral agency bestows moral
autonomy, the ability to make decisions predicated on moral
450. Jackson, supra note 85, at 150.
451. See SWARN LATA SHARMA, GENDER DISCIMINATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 60–62 (K.K. Publications 2000).
452. See generally ANJA SEIBERT-FOHR, PROSECUTING SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 186 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
453. See generally Griffin, supra note 398, at 101 (implying that human
rights impose universal duties by referring to them as “doubly universal”).
454. See generally, ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 1, Chapter 7.
455. See J. N. Hooker, Moral Implications of Rational Choice Theories (July
2011), available at http://ba.gsia.cmu.edu/jnh/rationalChoiceTheoriesPost.pdf.
456. James Griffin, Human Rights: Whose Duties?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANISATIONS 31, 31-43 (Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., Kluwer
2004).
457. ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 6, 13 (Univ. Chi. Press
1996); ALAN GEWIRTH, REASONS AND MORALITY 30–32 (Univ. Chi. Press
1978).
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reflection.
Without the freedom required by choice, moral agency is
impeded. Carving out space in which moral agency can take
shape is a primary human interest and a central moral value.
Making sure that moral agents are free from arbitrary
constraint that would inhibit the exercise of moral agency is an
important moral objective. Society needs human rights to
shield the freedom necessary to pursue chosen goals.458 This is
a universal human need shared equally by all. Human rights
values and principles thereby define and protect interests that
all humans share.459
4. Equality
Moral agency is something that all humans have in
common, and what all humans need to exercise their agency is
equally shared.460 Moral equality stems from humans’ ability to
deliberate and choose how they want to live. Disregarding the
fact that as moral agents all humans are created equal leads to
impositions of arbitrary constraints inhibiting the ability of
people to lead lives of their own choice. This amounts to a form
of unfair discrimination against them.461 The impact of
discrimination is to arbitrarily constrain the ability of those
discriminated against to direct their lives as they choose.462
There is a strong linkage between the regulative idea of human
rights with the regulative idea of the rule of law: both ideas are
squarely opposed to morally arbitrary conduct towards human
beings.
5. Dignity
The logic of moral agency implies dignity.463 Moral agency
carries no value unless people are free to express what that
agency confers.464 To recognize autonomy means treating those
458. See, e.g., Preamble to Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
Act, No. 43/2006 (Victoria 2006).
459. Gewirth, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 457, at 9.
460. Griffin, supra note 398, at 32–33 (discussing the nature of human
agency).
461. Id. at 33 (“[O]thers must not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one
sees as a worthwhile life.”).
462. Id.
463. See Griffin, supra note 456, at 31–33 (discussing the connection
between human rights and dignity).
464. See Garth Kemerling, Kant: The Moral Order, PHILOSOPHY PAGES,
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm (last modified Nov. 12, 2011).
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whose freedom and autonomy is respected with dignity.465
Owing to people’s shared status as moral agents able to orient
their lives in line with values of their own choosing, people are
all equally worthy of being extended respect and dignity.466
6. Intrinsic Versus Instrumental Value of Human Rights
Human rights carry instrumental and intrinsic value in
the sense that their respect paves a path of freedom that lets
people do things they otherwise could not do.467 Respect for
human rights guarantees equal and fair access to education,
employment, medical care, and recreation.468 Human rights
establish an economic, legal, political, and social atmosphere in
which people can live by values of their own choice unhampered
by arbitrary barriers. Thus people all have the same interest in
making sure human rights are secured.
Human rights are intrinsically valuable because they
affirm that people are equal in moral status to one another and
worthy of equal treatment on all matters bearing on their
capacity to exercise moral judgment.
7. Protecting Human Rights within Global Economic
Governance Schemes
Respecting
human
rights
does
not
necessitate
institutionalizing them solely through “hard” international law
backed up by formal enforcement.469 There is no inherent
contradiction
in
proposing
decentralized,
informal
arrangements wherein values upon which human rights are
based (freedom, equality, and dignity) are entrenched in
transnational governance syndicates in ways that do not
trigger traditional coercive and centralized modes of formal
protection.
Concerning the responsibility of participants in
transnational governance régimes, whether corporations,
465. Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 28,
2008),
http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/
The%20Stupidity%20of%20Dignity.htm (arguing that dignity is merely
another application of the principle of autonomy).
466. See Griffin, supra note 456, at 31–33.
467. O’Neill¸ supra note 376, at 188 (discussing instrumental justifications
for human rights).
468. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
469. Donnelly, supra note 398, at 164–166 (discussing the choice of means
of enforcing international human rights objectives).
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NGOs, governments, or civil society actors, it is at the point
where some protection, formal or informal, is called for that the
obligation to extend protective efforts arise.470 For this to come
about, a right must be ensconced in some system of norms.471
Whereas previously it was normally supposed that such a
system of norms could only take the form of formal rules
promulgated and enforced by states, either in a “vertical”
fashion in relation to their own citizens or in a “horizontal”
fashion in relation to members of the international community
at large, today’s global governance through “soft law” provides
alternative configurations for systematizing norms for human
rights.472
Because human rights safeguard core and overriding moral
values and institutionalize their respect, protection and
promotion are priorities not only for nation-states but also for
economic actors at national and international levels. It follows
that where the ability to directly advance respect for human
rights and where the ability to indirectly secure or assist in
securing their respect exists, there exists also an obligation to
do so. Because institutionalizing respect for human rights is so
basic, where the ability to institutionalize that respect exists,
exerting that ability is also a primary moral obligation.
The purpose of human rights is at root in harmony with
the purpose of the rule of law, properly understood as
establishing conditions under which human dignity, freedom,
and equality will flourish.473 Far from what might be supposed
from the seemingly “voluntary” character of many
commitments to global civil regulations by business
enterprises, the obligations flowing from the existence of
human rights are not voluntary. Where they are in jeopardy,
human rights must be entrenched not only in centralized and
formal coercive systems of “hard” rules of international law, but
470. Contra Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders,
12:1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2012) (asserting that “every state with the
capacity to effectively influence genocidal actors has an obligation to take all
means reasonably available to prevent genocide as soon as they become aware
of a serious risk that the crime will be committed.”).
471. Kevin Jackson, Normative Systemization for Integrating Human
Rights Into International Business, 78 ARCHIV FUR RECHTS UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 111, 112 (2001).
472. Donnelly, supra note 398, at 164–166 (discussing the choice of means
of enforcing international human rights objectives).
473. Id. at 166–68 (discussing the purposes of international human rights
policies).
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even more importantly in decentralized and informal systems
of “soft” norms of economic governance régimes. Regardless, the
rule of law ideal which underwrites these respective normative
systems demands that the norms be binding and overriding in
their essential characters.
It is impossible to provide definitive resolution for what is
a permanent issue of disputation: the precise scope and extent
of human rights obligations for business.474 It can, however, be
said with certainty that a shift is occurring away from the view
that states are the only actors having binding obligations to
honor and preserve the human rights of global citizens.475 As
well, it is widely acknowledged that business enterprises have
an obligation to obey international law in its variant forms,
both traditional and emergent.476 Because human rights go to
the very heart of the international rule of law, it follows that
corporations shoulder responsibilities for upholding such
standards. Moreover, as stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, a widespread responsibility rests with all
people and all components of society to uphold respect for
human rights.477
Because corporations, intergovernmental organizations,
and organs of civil society have human rights obligations, their
allegiance to the international rule of law will mandate a
commitment to institutionalization of human rights practices
474. For treatment of this issue, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS (Tom
Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., 2004).
475. See David Horton, Illuminating the Path of Aliens’ Judicial Recourse:
Preventing Another Bowoto v. Chevron by Congressional Legislation, 10:1
APPALACHIAN J. L. 27, 45 (2010) (asserting that the passage of the Bowoto
Alien Tort Claims Against American Corporations Extracting Natural
Resource Act of 2009 “could essentially transform multinational corporations
into responsible members of the community by forcing them to show a
commitment to human rights, or else be sued.”).
476. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to
Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding Principles for the
Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance 107 (2012), available at
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Conferences/GlobeJune2012_FromInstit
utionalMisalignments.pdf.
477. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[A]s a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance.”).
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and principles to the extent they are capable of doing so.
8. Impacting Public Discussion and Deliberation
Following from the principle that with power comes
responsibility,478 the collaborative power of economic actors
should be channeled to shape public policy to foster fulfillment
of human rights obligations. Corporations should encourage
governments with whom they engage and interact to fulfill
their obligations under the rule of law, especially in connection
with institutionalizing protection for human rights. This
obligation must of necessity mean support for implanting in
institutional frameworks the requirement that NGOs, IGOs,
and companies themselves respect and protect human rights
wherever they are doing business.
In line with the rule of law’s opposition to arbitrary
exercise of power, this should not be conceived of as a merely
discretionary obligation.479 The obligation exists whether acted
on or not. However, it is clear that by its very nature the
obligation must be self-imposed and in that sense voluntary. It
is not an obligation that can be imposed exclusively by means
of “hard” international legal instrumentalities, even though
hard law can be deployed, for example, to delimit the power of
corporations to influence public policy by imposing restrictions
on advertising and by curbing contributions to political parties
and candidates.
Especially in developing and underdeveloped regions of the
globe, the activities of corporations may exert more direct
bearing on overall human well-being than their populations’
respective governments.480 Even where strong and stable
government is the order of the day, corporations, with their
financial resources and access to technology and science, are
equipped to produce products whose potential impacts
governments do not have the wherewithal to assess and
478. Keith Davis, Can Business Afford to Ignore Social Responsibilities? 2
CAL. MGMT. REV. 70 (1960).
479. Waddock & Smith, supra note 393, at 47–62 (“Too much of the time,
when we think about . . . corporate responsibility, we think about it as a
discretionary responsibility.”).
480. Corporate
Accountability,
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/campaigns/demand-dignity/issues/corporationshuman-rights-and-poverty (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (“Yet all too often,
human rights are abused as corporations exploit weak and poorly enforced
domestic regulation and the lack of international accountability mechanisms
to devastating effect in developing countries.”).
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regulate.481 So too, in international counsels, corporate access
to knowledge and information with its implications for
economic development makes corporate involvement in shaping
international policies and institutions manifest.
9. Responsibility for Institutionalization
Referring back to the idea of international rule of law
developed
over
the
course
of
this
article,
the
institutionalization of human rights protections under the
guidance of rule of law requires several things. It must be
possible in theory and practice to implant human rights
protections in the form of rules or principles that carry a
reasonable measure of clarity and definitiveness in business
management systems. Pursuant to the rule of law demand for
publicity, implementations of the rules must be monitored to
ascertain compliance and findings transmitted in publicly
accessible documents. Pursuant to the rule of law demand for
transparency, the reports must be subject to verification.
Unless these conditions are met, it is not possible to establish
whether respect for the rights in question has been
institutionalized and whether a business enterprise’s human
rights obligations are being satisfied.
As was illustrated in the overview section on global
governance régimes, there is evidence that a groundwork upon
which many of these conditions may be established already
exists in one form or another.482 Management systems are
being developed and refined to allow training, monitoring,
reporting and auditing.483 The Global Reporting Initiative has
developed reasonably transparent monitoring and reporting
systems.484 AccountAbility, Social Accountability International,
Transparency International, and other public, private, and
481. Harold James, The Ethics of Business Life; Some Historical
Reflections, in RETHINKING BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 19 (James R. Stoner, Jr.
& Samuel Gregg eds., Witherspoon Inst. 2008).
482. See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra note 153 (addressing hard law
forms of accountability); Keohane, supra note 167 (discussing soft law forms of
accountability).
483. See Reporting Framework Overview, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-frameworkoverview/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); see, e.g., About SAI,
SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.sa-intl.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
484. See Reporting Framework Overview, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-frameworkoverview/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
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voluntary sector organizations are creating sophisticated
management systems for infusing ethical standards into
organizations and for monitoring, reporting and auditing the
implementation of such standards.485 Access to these systems
and training programs means that companies today are able to
institutionalize protection of human rights in their operations.
Still needed, however, is acknowledgement that the
obligation to institutionalize protection for human rights
expands beyond nation-states to private companies and the
host of institutions and organizations playing a part in
governing how business is conducted globally. It has been
argued that, first, power bestows responsibility and second,
that such power also draws into the transnational governance
equation the fundamental requirements of the rule of law. Both
of these moral principles attach not only to states but also to
private sector, for-profit enterprises, and other global
participants.
III. CONCLUSION
Global economic governance régimes today presuppose the
rule of law as a regulative ideal and human rights as noninstrumental moral principles. Although the rule of law is not
an all-or-nothing concept, the regulative ideal requires that
global governance institutions should manifest the antithesis of
any arbitrary exercise of power and should strive to embody
reasonable degrees of certainty, coherence, and transparency.
Regarding human rights, the regulative ideal requires that
participants in governance régimes strive to institutionalize
respect and protection for such rights.
On the regulative conception, any conflicts or apparent
contradictions uncovered by skeptics will serve as incentives for
renewed efforts in pursuit of the rule of law. The rule of law,
properly understood as a regulative ideal, remains regardless of
the directions taken by power politics and international
relations.
Understanding the international rule of law as a regulative
ideal means that the contradictions and conflicts addressed by
skeptics regarding law and new governance initiatives serve
not as justification for across-the-board nihilism, but instead as
a rallying call for renewed efforts in pursuit of realizing the
485. See, e.g., About SAI, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2012).
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moral idea of rule of law in international economic relations.
It makes sense both from theoretical and practical
perspectives to orient one’s thinking about global economic
governance with a focus on the rule of law and human rights.
In the context of a rapidly globalizing economy, the justification
of responsible business conduct across borders and cultures is
more and more becoming a pressing practical concern. Within
such a landscape, the universal foundations of the rule of law
and human rights render them precious normative ideals given
the ongoing struggles to identify a common ground amongst the
different legal, cultural and moral traditions in the world
today.
This article has argued that the non-instrumental and
universal justifiability of human rights and the rule of law
provide a more stable epistemological platform for global
economic governance than instrumental approaches are able to
provide. Although disagreements persist concerning the precise
scope and weight to be accorded to human rights in particular
cases, the status of human rights as an objective moral ideal
provides a basis upon which practical discussion of global
responsibilities is made possible. This is especially crucial to
debates about the shared responsibilities of participants in
global governance initiatives. It makes sense for nation-states,
intergovernmental
organizations,
and
transnational
corporations to invoke the discourse of rule of law and human
rights
when
deliberating
their
joint
and
several
responsibilities. After all, the demand for universal justification
both empowers and constrains corresponding legal and moral
obligations of economic actors on the international stage.
Humans possess the ability to learn and to change their
basic operating assumptions when necessity and logic call for
it. Through their trust in the authority of moral ideals and the
will for change, it is possible to move toward a world that takes
the non-instrumental moral character of international human
rights seriously. Even though attaining a complete realization
of the ideal of a cosmopolitan world order committed to the rule
of law “always remains a pious wish, still we are certainly not
deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working
incessantly towards it.”486 Advancement of global economic
governance régimes toward a closer approximation of the ideals
of rule of law and human rights is surely preferable to ceding
486. Kant, supra note 376, at 161.
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affairs to domination by partisan interests of power players in a
world order adverse to such ideals.

